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Chapter 1

The Traditional Foreign Policy of the United states
The memorable message which President Wilson addressed to
the Extraordinary Session of Congress on April 2, 1917, advislng a Declaration of War against the Imperial Government of
Germany, stands as a landmark in the hlstory of the foreign
policy of the United states.

His action, arising from his

conviction that the honor of the United states could be maintained only by actively espousing the cause of the Allies,
marks a reversal Of the time-honored and cherished attltude
of non-intervention which through the years had become an integral part Of oUr national llfe.

So deep-rooted had become

OUr acoeptanoe of the idea of isolation, that only eyents of
the very gravest oharacter, reacting upon the oonviotions and
emotions of the people as a whole, as well as upon their
leader, would enable them to countenance SUch a break with
tradition.
Why was such a course possible?

Why was the President

a ble to lead ·the nation into war in spite of his earlier determination to avoid foreign entanglements?

The answers to

these questions must be sought in the events and the diplomatio developments of the troublesome years of neutralityBut before attempting to trace these foroes a brief consid-

~

--------------------------------------------,
eration of the traditional foreign policy of the United states
may lead to a better understanding of the signiticance.ot
president Wilson's action.

Moreover, as the declaration of

war drew the United states into the closest co-operation with
England, a survey ot the relations between these two countries
during the previous century may not be amiss.
The earliest policy of the United states was not one ot isolation.

In their struggle for freedom the colonies sought

and accepted toreign aid.

But, although they welcomed the

alliance with France in 1778, that same alliance later threatened to draw the new republic into the maelstrom ot the European Wars.

During her struggle with England the French Rev-

olutionarY Government attempted to secure the help ot the
United states according to the terms ot this treaty.

In

this national crisis Washington, ,on April 22, 1793, issued
his tamous proclamation ot neutrality in Which he pledged the
United states to a " ••• conduct friendly and impartial to the
1

belligerent powers."
His views on the proper relations ot this country with
Europe were amplitied in his Farewell Address, september 17,
1796, in which he advised that the United states in the tuture
refrain from fOrming permanent alliances with any portion ot
the rest of the world.

Because ot our distant situation he

1

James D. Richardson, Compiler, A Compilation of the Messa~s
and Papers ot the PreSidents, 10 V., New York, 1897, I, 1 8.

,...

-~----------------------------------~--------------------~
maintained such ties would be artificial and would serve mere-

ly to bring this country into controversies, the

cause~of

2

which were not our concern.
washington's injunction, reinforced by similar

pronounc.~

ments by later presidents and statesmen, came to have increased weight and significance.

The issuariQe in 18 2 3 of

the Monroe Doctrine, which placed the principle of non-intervention by Europe in American affairs side by side with the
principle of American isolation from Europe, was the final
bulwark which made these two principles an integral part of
American policy.

All through the nineteenth century the idea

that the welfare of the nation was irrevocably bound up With
the principle of the Monroe Doctrine was firmly adhered to by
both statesman and citizen.

Fears that American participa-

tion in international conferences WaS ushering in a new era in
our foreign relations proved to be unfounded.

On the occasion

of signing the treaty drawn up at the Hague Peace Conference,
the delegates did so with the reservation that no departure
from the traditional policy of the United states should be
inferred from any part of the treaty.

Similar sentiments

were expressed by the Senate in 1906 in ratifying the treaty
drawn up at the Algeciras Conference.
But While the United states adhered to the tradition of
political isolation, her foreign policy has all through her
2

llli·,

I, 215·

history been influenced by the desire to extend her commerce
This has, necessarily, brougbt her

with toreign countr1es.

into very close contact With Great Brltain, the leading
mercial nation ot the world.
tionship was lneVitable.

co~

For many reasons such a rela-

England was the mother country from

which to a large degree were der1 ved our language, our culture,
and our inst1tutlons.

From the very beginning the bulk ot our

trade was With the Brltlsh Isles.

Koreover, the Atlantlc

ocean, which has been our chiet hlghway ot intercourse With the
natlons ot the world, bas been dominated by the Brlt1sh Navy
3
and merchant marlne.
This very closeness ot contact has resulted in many occasions ot disagreement.

The concluslon ot the War ot Independ-

ence lett many questlons stlll unsettled.

Brlt1sh occupation

ot the Northwest, debt disputes, and ditticultles over boundaries served to keep alive teelings ot bltterness and resentmente

The situatlon was further comp11cated by condltions '

in Europe growing out of the French Revolution.

The out break

ot war between France and England Ja9.rked the beginnlng of a
struggle which in many ways was parallel to the perlod trom

1914 to 1917.

Trade, whlch bad been renewed after the Reva-

lutloDary War and was then thriving, became subject to restrictions imposed by both countries.

Then as in the recent period,

according to Moore, the Un1ted states was taced With the prob3

John Holloday Latane, From Isolat10n to Leadership, New York,
Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922, 100.

lem ot deciding ..... how tar neutral powers are required to subordinate the interests ot their commerce to the hostiLt inter4
ests ot belligerents. U
The Treaty ot Ghent settled none ot the issues ot the War

ot 1812.

It did, however, pave the Vlay tor the settlement

by diplomatic procedure ot some of the most vexing

s~bJects

This method was

ot controversy between the two countries.

particularly successtul in settling questions involving our
northern boundaries and the tisheries.

But in questions re-

lating to the treedom ot the seas it proved inettecti ve.

As

a consequence, thecontlict ot maritime interests remained
for many years a potential source ot IrrItatIon between the
two nations.
Their tormal diplomatiC intercourse

~hows

that the states-

men ot bOth countries were undoubtedly animated by a sincere
desire to ettect harmonious relations.
int~rests

Nevertheless powertul

and deep teelings in both countries were working

1ncessantly in the oppOSite direction.

The

~ailure

to reach

an agreement in matters respecting commerce and naVigation was
attributed by Dunning to the very nature ot the problem.

He

said that it was " ••• inherent in the general condition ot
world politics that America should be seeking new things and
Great Britain should be standing by the old •••• The new comer
among maritime powers tound herselt barred in every direction

;

John Bassett Moore, American Diplomacy, Its Spirit and
AChievements, New Yort, Harper and Bros., 1905, 53.·

'trom profltable trade."

5

The right of natlons to regulate

commerce ln thelr, own lnterests bad hltherto been unqulstloned
and the Amerlcan demand for freedom ot commerclal lntercourse
was a departure from accepted ideas.
Between 1815 and the Clvil War a number of dlsputes arose,
a few of whlch, such as the Oregon questlon, were serious
enough to threaten peaceful relations with England.

In spite,

however, of the bltterness in the United states that remalned
as a legacy from the Revolution and the war of 1812, and in
splte of the antl-Brltish influence exerted by large groups of
Irlsh lmmigrants, the Government Was able to adjust by arbltratlon all of lts ,dlfflculties with England durlng thls
perlod.
A fresh crlsls developed durlng the Clvll War.

Brltlsh

recognition of the Confederate states as a belllgerent aroused
bltter protests in the North.

The Trent Affalr brought the

na tlons to the verge of war and revealed a curious reversal
of their historic posltions, with the Unlted states Uphold1ng
the right of search and seizure and Great Britain upholding
the princ1ple ot the freedom of the seas.

Relations were

still further stralned by the controversy over the depredations of the Alabama.

Continued refusal by the Br1tish Gov-

ernment to consider proposals for a settlement were countered
by ant1-English measures in this country.

An ind1cat1on of

5
W1ll1am Archlbald Dunnlng, nThe British Em~1re and the
yrtited states, New York, Charles Scribne8s Sons, 1914, 39.

P:=

thiS waS the open encouragement glven to the Fenian Movement.

6

Later a more concl1iatory splrlt on the part of Great Brlta1n
led to the submisslon of the questlons in d1spute to an lnternatlonal board of arbltratlon.

A judgment rendered ln favor

of the United states was promptly pald by Great Britaln ln
splte of the d1ssenting oplnlon ot the British member of the
bOard.·

Thls was the ]lost tamous case that had ever been sub-

m1tted to arbitration and 1ts successful adjustment " ••• encouraged the hope that the two great Engllsh-speaking peoples
7
would never agaln have to resort to arms. It
A subsequent movement for a permanent treaty of arbltration
which def1ni tely would suPplant war as a means of settllng
future controversies was unsuccessful.

This movement was the

outcome of the settlement by arbltration of the friction which
developed in 1895 over the Venezuela boundary.

The tailure

of the Senate to ratify such a treaty was a great disappointment to all friends of permanent peace.
Great Brlta1n's taclt approval of the course of the Un1ted
states in the Spanish-Amerlcan War dld much to foster the
growth of a more friendly feeling.

The cordial relatlons

manifested during the early years of the twentieth century
seemed to indicate that the two natlons were drawing closer
6
La. tane , 113

7

Ibid., 115

together 1n sympathy and a sp1r1t ot co-operat1on.

Dunn1ng

attr1butes th1s to an "1nt1mate like-m.1ndedness" wh1ch;', he
says, 1s an 1nd1spensable factor 1n 1nternational amity.

On

the eve ot the World War he expressed the op1nion that: "The
whole trend ot modern development in c1vilizat1on is strongly
toward the 1nd1spensable work1ng ot th1s tactor.

Its intlu-

ence ls most marked, honever, where hlstorical ldentity of
language and tradi tlon clears the way.

The people of the

Unlted States and Great Brltaln are drawlng nearer each
other dally ln both the mater1al and splritual aspects ot
8
llfe. tt

8

Dunnlng, 252.

.'

Chapter II
The Problems of Neutrality

In the years immediately preceding the World War many people in the United states felt that we faced the dawn of an era
of internaional co-operation and good will.

In his Annual

Message to Congress on December 2, 1913, President Wilson
noted the " ••• many happy manifestations ••• of a growing cordiality and sense of a community of interest among the nations, foreshadowing an age of settled peace and good will."
This, he felt, would result in an ever-increasing willingne$s
to " ••• bind themselves by solemn treaty to the processes of
1
peace, the processes of fair concession."
In the United
states, as in Europe, a movement for peace flourished.

Just

prior to the war peace societies had a phenomenal growth,
sixty-three organizations being devoted to the cause.

2

These

societies enjoyed the support of many of the most prominent
business leaders, professional men and philanthropists in the
country.

President Wilson and Secretary of state William

Jennings Bryan attested their devotion to the cause of peace
1

a

E.E.Robinson and V.J.West, The Foreign POliC of foodrow
Wilson, New York, MacMillan Company, 1917, ~3. ~
2

Merle Cu~, Peace or War, The American Struggle, 1636-1936
New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1936, 201.

by joining the American Peace Society in 1913.

3

The move-

ment was subsidized by wealthy men, notably Andrew Cartiegie,
who endowed an organization designed to toster international
peace.
All of these dreams were shattered in the summer of 1914
when most of the leading nations of Europe took up arms.
Immediately upon the Outbreak of war President Wilson issued
a formal proclamation of neutrality! which was repeated as
successive nations entered the war.

This proclamation was

quite in keeping with his ideals of peace and his allegiance
to the traditional American principle of isolation.

"Amer-

ica, tt he said, "must live her own life- _• free trom entangling
5
alliances."
In a statement to the press, he expressed his
determination to observe the strictest neutrality in every
act ot the Government in order not to give the slightest
6
offense to anyone ot the powers involved.
3

Ibid., 200.

4

Supplement to the American Journal ot International taw,
Di lomatic Correspondence between the United States and
Be Ii erent Governments Rel&tin to Neutral Ri ts and
3 V., New York, Ba er Voorhis and Co-, 9
110-114.

1

5

Ray Stannard Baker and Wtlliam Edward Dodd, Eds., The

Public Papers ot Woodrow Wilson, New York, Harper and
Brothers, 1915-1927, III, 101.

6

New York Tribune, August 4, 1914.

The general reactlon or the people ot the Unlted States to
the pre~ldentts actlon was aptly stated In an edltorlaf In the
New york Trlbune: "Every American Is reflectlng these days
u'Oon the Inestlmable value of our Isolatlon trom the armed
camp.

The neutrallty proclamatlon of Presldent Wllson Is the

relteratlon of the pollcy of detachment whlch every Amerlcan
schoolboy reads In Washington's words of far-seelng wlsdom
7
and whlch we shall forget to our sorrow. tt
Two weeks later,
on August 18, the Presldent Issued an Appeal

~ ~

Ameriean

people asklng them to act and speak In the true splrlt ot 1~
8
partlallty and frlendllness to all concerned.
He reallzed
that the cltlzens of the Unlted States traced thelr raclal
orlglns to many countrles, partlcularly to those at war, and
that consequently the utmost extremes ot s1D'1pathy would be
natural and 1nevitable.He, therefore, warned them agalnst
what he called the " ••• the deepest, most subtle, most essentlal breach ot neutrallty ••• whlch would sprlng from passlonate partlsanshlp."
The extent to whlch elther the cltlzens or thelr leaders
could contorm to thls lotty Ideal ot remalnlng Impartlal I'n
thought as In actlon, Is certalnly a matter tor debate.

An

exact evaluatlon ot publlc oplnlon Is dlfflcult, If not ab7
8

New York Trlbune, August 5, 1914.

~merlcan

Journal of Internatlonal Law, IX, 199.

solutely 1mpossible, due part1ally to the complex1tT of our
racial structure, the var1at1on of economic and eultu.r4l 1nterests from section to sect1on, and to the inart1culateness
of large groups of the people •

Generalizations, therefore,

.are dangerous but for the most part historians are ot the
op1nion that the dominant feeling in the East, where the
bonds with England had always been the strongest, favored
the Allles and that farther from the se~coast the enthuslasm
9
for the Allies decreased.
In this conneetlon, seymour
stated that British and French sympathizers made little progress in the Jl1ddle West and the West and that GerBlB.n sympathlzers made none in the East.
The attltude of the press was, generally speaking, more
favorable to the Allied than to the German cause.

This was

due in part to a lack of sympathy with what was c.ns1dered
the extremely

m11lta~stic

policy of the German Government,

but more part1cularly to the violat1on by that government of
the neutra11ty of Belglum.

Promlnent citizens of German ex-

traction and German newspapers and soc1et1es protested against
the unfa1r treatment they telt they were receiv1ng from the
newspape~s

ot the country.

10

In defense of their posit1on

9
Charles Seymour, American Neutrality,' 1914-1917, New Haven
Yale Un1vers1ty Press, 1935, 147.
10 .

"Blaming Germany for the War", L1terary Digest,

294, August 22, 1914.

v.

49, 293-

,....

~----------------------~----~
many editorial writers made that distinction, which was to be-

.'

come so familiar during the course ot the war, between the
German people, whom they highly honored, and the German Government.

In spite, however, of the natural sympathy shown .

to one side or the other, it was undoubtedly true that the
majority ot American citizens telt that the war was a strictly
European affair and could not affect us.
The maintenance ot a strict neutrality presented problems
of increasing complexity as the war progressed.

Neither our

isolated position nor our freedom from entangling alliances
was sufficient to keep us from becoming Involved In the Intricacies of the conflict.

That this became evident ImmedI-

ately was evIdenced by edItorIal comment throughout the country.

In the fIrst few weeks ot the war the statement was made

in the .-Ba=l..;;;,t.-1m;;;;;o.;;;..;;..re,. !!.!!. that complIcatIons were bound to ens:ue,
" ••• for our relations wIth each country, if advantageous to
her, are as distastetul to her enemies."

Prophetically, it

continued " ••• we must expect attempts at abuse of our neutrality, and we must fIght as desperately to guard It against the
slightest infraction, intentional or otherwIse, while still
offering to each of the warrIng powers the hospItable consid11
eration ot a friendly natIon."
Similar vIews were expressed In the St. Louis Democrat which warned the nation that
11

Editorial Comment from the Baltimore News, quoted in the
Literary DIgest, V. 49, 292, August 22, 1914.

a mere declaration of neutrality, issued in a spir1t of fr1end-

.'

l1ness toward all belligerents oould not safeguard the country
against dangers resulting from oontinued hostilities.

The

desperat10n of the oombatants, the 1nev1table reSult of a
p~olonged

war, would impel them to make

se1~ures

on land Or

sea, either for po1nts of tactical advantage Or for art1cles
11sted as contraband.

Any of these acts in v101ation of the

r1ghts of the Un1ted states might eas11y lead to comp11cat1ons
12
w1th one or more of the warr1ng powers.
These prophecies proved to be extremely aocurate.

Quite

early in the war, 1t became olear that a major portion of the
attent10n of the bel11gerents was to be concentrated upon the
effort to get oontrol of the sea.

Continuance of oommercial

relat10ns w1th the rest ot the world was essent1al to the welfare of both sides.

For many months after the opening of hos-

t111ties the Al11ed nat10ns were torced to depend upon the
Un1ted states for a great portion of their munitions.

Later,

when the war became a protracted struggle, they looked to this
countJlY as an important source of food, raw mter1als and cre13
dit.
On the other hand, the Central powers were, at least
12
Editorial Comment from the st. Louis Demoorat, quoted by
the Literary D1gest, v. 49', 292, Aug. 22, 1914.
13

Charles Seymour, American Diplomaci During the World War,
Balt1more, John Hopk1ns Press, 193 , 9.

during the first years of the war, fairly self-sufficient in

.,

the matter of munitions but were greatly in need of raw materials and food.

It was quite eVident, therefore, that without

access to the world's markets, neither

8~de

could hope for

succes s in a prolonged war.
In any struggle for command of the seas the United states
has inevitably become involved.

Now, as in the period pre-

ceding the War of 1812, she became the champion of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas.

She thus came into direct

conflict with Great Britain who adhered to the doctrine of the
command of the seas.

The pOSitions assumed by the two na-

tions were consistent with the general tone of the1r national
policy for, as stated by Kenworthy and Young, t'Command of the
Seas has been the Pallad1um of the British Since the 1nstitution of the United K1ngdom.

Freedom

0

f the Sea s ba s been the

Palladium of the Americans since the independence of the
14
Un1ted States."
In essence, the difference between these
two doctrines was the d1fference between the rights of bel11gerents and the rights of' neutrals.

Great Britain claimed

the right to command the seas on the ground that her very existence was dependent upon keeping open the channels of internal communication.

14

But inasmuch as these channels coincided

Joseph w. Kenworthy and George Young, Freedom of the Seas,
New York, Liveright, 1929, 15.

wi th

the great highways of interns. tional trade, thelr control

by one nation was almost certaln to result in restrtcttons
upon the free intercourse of other nat1ons.
The h1story of Br1tish seapower reveals that it has not
been based upon the sanctity of any cod1f1ed or customary
. law.

A study ot their actual pract1ce 1n warfare shows

little considerat1on tor the rights ot neutrals or the respons1bili t1es ot b elllgerents.

Lloyd George just1fles

this att1tude by saylng that: "Nations tight1ng for thelr
.
15
l1ves cannot always pause to observe punctlllos."
The
keynote of the Brltlsh polley in the World War was expressed by the Pr1me Minister, Mr. Asquith, in an Address to
the House of Commons in which he said; ..... we are not going
to allow our eftorts to be strangled in a network ot juridical nlceties ••• under exist1ng cond1tions there 1s no torm
of econom1c pressure to whlch we do not cons1der ourselves
16
ent1tled to resort."
The last 1mportant effort to regulate maritime relations
was made 1n 1909 when the ten leading marit1me nat10ns held

15
Dav1d Lloyd George, war Memoirs, 2 V., Boston, Little,
Brown and Company, 1933, II, 111.
16
Quoted by Kenworthy abd Young, 27.

a conference in London.
1f8,S

The idea underlying the negotiations

.

the same that had been the basis of the Amerlcan posltion

all through the hlstOry of the natlon, namely that the rlghts
of neutrals should be determlned by a power greater than the·
11
w1ll of any single belligerent.
The Declaratlon drawn up
by the Conference was an attempt to clarify naval practice
and to embody it ln a set of accepted rules.

Among other

things, lt valldated the 1nterpretatlon of the doctrine of
"contlnuous voyage" given by the Unlted state's during the
Civll War, namely that the ultlmate destlnatlon of the goods
must be taken lnto consideratlon.

It also protected neutral

commerce

~n

condltional contraband when bound to neutral coun-

trles.

Contraband was redeflned ln lts two categorles, abso- .

lute and conditlonal.

Absolute contraband was to consist of

goods excluslvely used for war and destined for

an:~nemy,

if passlng through a neutral country enroute.

To thi s .lass

of goods the rule ot ·continuous

voyage~was

to apply-

even

Condi-

tlonal contraband conslsted of goods whlch mlght have a peaceful use but whlch were also susceptible of use ln war and,which
were destined for the armed forces or a government department
of a belllgerent state.

To these goods the rule of ·contln-

uous voyage" did not apply.

In other words conditlonal

co~

traband comprised artlcles that'l.were used genemlly by clvillan
populatlons as well as by armies and only when destlned for

17
Robinson and West, 45.

....,
army use were they to be treated as contraband.

18

In view of the fact that Great Brl taln had a vastly !\lperlor naval force, the Conference was somewhat ln the nature of
an attempt to 11mlt her use of that power.

As a result the

ratlflcatlon of the Declaratlon of London was blocked by the

.

,:j, ..,

House of Lords.

For the same reason that made lt unaccep-

able to Great Brltaln, namely that lt was too favorable to
neutral trade, lt won the favor of the',ierman Government.

In

the event of a future war the observance of the provlslons of
the Declaratlon would enable Germany to draw upon adjacent
neutrals for suPplles.
tact ln her Prlze Law.

19

Germany accordlngly embodlea lt InIt was ratlfied also by the Senate

·of the United States but, when lt was rejected by Great Britaln, the President wlthheld flnal ratificatlon, a course
which was followed

~

the other governments.
,

When war broke out ln 1914, the Government of the Unlted
states lnqulred whether the Brltlsh Government would be 11'111ing to agree that the laws of naval warfare as laid down by
the

De~laration

of London should be appllcable durlng the

present confllct, prov1dlng that t he Governments wlth whom
Great Br1ta\n was at war also agreed.

The commun1catlon
~

18

Samuel Flagg Bemls, A Dlplomatlc H1story of the United
States, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1936, 591.
19
~.,

589.

F ____~--------------------------------------------~

pointed out that an acceptance ot these rules would prevent
grave misunderstandings whlch might arise as to the

re~tlo.ns

20

between the neutral powers and the belllgerents.

The Bri-

tish Forelgn Mlnister replied that the Government'had decided
to adopt generally the rules ot the Declaration

tI • • •

subJect

to certain moditications and additlons which they judge indls-

.

21

pensable to the etticient aDnduct ot their naval operations!
The retusal ot

th~

British Government to accept the

Dec~ra~

tion ot London without moditication prompted the United States
to w1thdraw the proposal tor 1ts adoption as a temporary code

ot naval wartare to be observed by be1llgerents and neutrals
during the war.

Lacking such a code the Government stated

its intention to insist that the rights and duties ot the
United states and its citlzens were to be detlned by the existing rules ot international law and the eXisting treatles.
It also reserved the right to protest each violation ot its
rights.

22

Untrammeled, there tore , by the Declaration ot London, Great
20

secretary ot state Bryan to Ambassador W. H. page, Aug. 6,
1914, American Journal &t Internatlonal Law, IX, 1.
21

M1nister ot Fore1gn Attairs Grey to Ambassldor W. H. Page,
Aug. 22, 1914, ~ •• IX. 3.
22

Acting secretary ot state Lansing to Ambassador W. H. Page,
Oct. 22, 1914, Ibid., IX, 1.

~~--------------------------------------I
Britain at the very outset of the war and by the magnitude of

her shipping was able to assume oommand of the seas.

4fIer

polioy and that of her Allies was to keep the seas open for
her own commerce and to close them absolutely to that of her
enemies.

German merchant ships were driven from the seas

and the German navy rendered ineffeotive.

Because of the

infer10rity of her naval power, Germany was not able to contest the Al11ed control of the seas but attempted by various
means to destroy the commerce of Great Britain.

Her prin-

cipal weapons of retaliation were mines and submarine attacks
upon commerce and the coast towns.

Both nations were ac-

tuated in this struggle by the desire to defeat the enemy by
economic strangulat10n and starvat10n and both d1sregarded
the princ1ples of internat10nal law when they threatel\ed ,to
interfere w1th the nat10nal policy.

The use of the submarine

by Germany to destroy on the high seas merchant sh1ps coming
to the Br1tish Isles, w1thout exam1nation or warn1ng, was
clearly a violation of accepted internat10nal practice.

23

On the other hand Great Br1t8in placed her ohief reliance
upon a blookade of German ports.

But a olose blookade was

not possible beoause of the mines placed by Germany 1n the
waters adjacent to her shores, and consequently the Br1tish
procedure could not, aocording to American lawyers, be called

23
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24

a blockade and was contrary to international law.
The only restraining influence in the conduct of sudh a
campaign lay in the possible effect upon the neutral powers
and, particularly, upon the greatest of the neutrals, the
united states.

Neutral rights were constantly endangered

and the extent of the respect paid to them depended, not on
the rules of international law, but on the fear of neutral
intervention.

25

Too flagrant a violation of American rights

might lead to an embargo upon exports Which would have proved
disastrous to the Allies.

Without the BaW mater1als and the

munit10ns wh1ch they could secure'only from the United states,
26
they could not carryon the war.
But wh1le a general embargo would seem to be an effective method of compelling observance of our neutral rights, 1ts use would in turn create
ser10us problems.

In the first place, the proolamation of

neutrality bad stated that all persons Within the country had
the right to manufacture and sell arms.

Th1s was according

to custom, there being no precedent to the contrary in international conflicts.

Interference with suoh sales might,

therefore, be regarded as an unfriendly aot by, the government
seeking to purohase.

Seoondly, an embargo would oertainly

24
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The critioal situation of England in regard to munitions is
disoussed in .detail by Lloyd George, I, 112-187.

...
bave precipitated an acute economic crisis.

At the outset of

the war the United states seemed to be on the verge
dustrial depression.

of~n

in-

Curtailment, therefore, of the prosper-

ity induced by the war orders of the Allies might have proved
not only an economic calamity but disastrous to the Democratic
party.

other factors which, without a doubt, rendered the mainteJ-nance of strict neutrality more complicated were the personal
views of the President and his advisers in resard. to the respective merits of the war aims of the belligerents.

To de-

termine the personal feelings of the President was a matter of
some difficw ty.

He was a man of scholarly and retiring

habits and his natural tendency toward seclusion was intensified'by the death of his wife a few weeks after the opening
of the war.

The evidence upon which to base an evaluation

of his attitude must, therefore, be gathered ,from several
sources.

The first of these will necessarily be the diplo-

matic intercourse with the belligerents during this period.
Seymour, whose close association with Colonel House would
seem to give some weight to his opinion, says that the diplomacy of the United States at this time was the diplomacy of
27
the President.
This opinion is supported by that of a
member of the Cabinet who said that the President's conduct
at the Cabinet meetings, immediately after his inauguration,

27
Seymour, American Diplomac!,
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28
1ndicated that he was going to be his own Secretary of state.
La ter

this same man denied the charge that the Ad.min1st1'-a tion

was too Bryanlstio by saying that the "president was doing the
29
leading and Bryan the following.
~

A

~ique

feature of the diplomacy of this period was that

much of it was oarried on outside of the regular diplomatic
channels.

The agent through whom these negotiations were

oonducted was the President's olosest friend and trusted ad-.
v1ser, Colonel House.

House was perhaps mOre familiar with

the President's ideas and react10ns in regard to the European
situation than any other person, and the frank and personal
charaoter of their oorrespondence makes it the most valuable
source of informat1on though, unforttmately, a great many of
the letters are not yet generally available.

Finally we may

learn something of Wilson's tee11ngs trom a study ot the 1mpress10ns received by the statesmen with whom he was, necessarily, in very olose touoh.
Aocord1ng to Colonel House, the personal sympathy of the
30
President was, from the very beginning, with the Allies.
Nevertheless, he insisted that his personal convictions should

28
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not affect his political attitude which was to be one of the
strictest neutrality.

His greatest desire was to be

strument through which peace could be restored.

t~e

in-

He also

shared the opinion of the majority of Americans that the war
was a distant event in which we could not and should not become involved.

An exceedingly interesting sidelight on the

President's attitude at this time is found in the Diary of
Colonel House.

An entry of August 30, 1914, says:

I was interested to hear him express as his
opinion what I had written him some time before in one of my letters, to the effect that
if Germany won it would change the course of
our civilization, and make the united states
a military nation ••• I found him as unsympathetic with the German attitude as the rest
of America.
He goes even further than I in
his condemnation of Germany's part in this
war, and almost allows his feeling to include
the German people as a whole rather than the
leaders alone.
He said German philosophy
was essent1ally selfish and lacking in spiri tuali ty. 31 .
The belief that the general feeling in the country was predOminantly friendly toward England and hostile to Germany WaS
also expressed by Theodore Roosevelt in a letter to the Br132
tish Ambassador at Washington.
This he attributed to the
consistent policy of friendliness manifested by England for
several decades and the unfriend11ness of Germany, particularly
during our trouble with Spain.

31
32

When comminicating this com-

Seymour, I.P., I, 293.

Stephen GWynn, Ed.,The Letters and Friendshi~! of Sir Cecil
Spring-Rice, A Record, 2V., London,Constable &: Co.Ltd.,
1929, II, 218.

ment to his government the Ambassador indicated that it was
He also added that

in conformitY with his own observations.

the entire state Department was on the side of the Allies
except Bryan.

This statement was correct at least in regard

to the Assistant secretary of state, Robert Lansing, who was

.

convinced that sooner or later the rihrted states would be
33
forced to enter the war on the side of the Allies.
In
this he differed radically from Bryan:hose greatest interest was in the movement for peace.
The British Ambassador felt that the President was in
sympathy with their cause.

In a letter to Grey he said:

"The President will be with us by birth and upbringing but
he is very much in the hands of our worst enemies and his
name is Z9ther compromised by the Panama. affair.

He Will

have to be rather conspicuously neutral and that he is try;

ing to be.

Our line is to say that we are confident that

he will favor neither one party nor the other and that all
34
we want is a fair field and no favors. It
On another occasion, in the course of an interview, Spring-Rice remarked
on the similarity between the sentiments of Wilson and Grey,
and he said

•

It • • •

there were tears in his eyes and I am sure

we can at the right moment depend on an understanding
heart.

33
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The views of another English statesman, Lloyd George, were
not, however, so optimistio.

He felt that it was a mttter

of great diffioulty to determine where President W11son's real
sympathies lay.

His deportment he desoribed as being so

t·stuu.iously unpleasant" to both sides that eaoh suspeoted h1m
of favoring the other.

The English oondemned him for the

severity of his Judgments on Allied aotivities " ••• not real,

izltng that this was due to the fear lest his private sympathies should peril the striot impartiality of attitude whioh
36

he was imposing on himself."

"

The attitude of the people

of Amerioa Lloyd George seems to have analyzed rather astutely.

While giving due oonsideration to the verdio. gen-

erally aocepted by England and Franoe, that" the predominating
opinion in America was pro-Ally, he nevertheless realized
that t here was a strong pro-German sentiment among the Germans of the Middle West and a "chronio hostllity" to England
among the Irish-Americans.

With a rare delicacy he reveals

his understanding of the latter group.

The former constitu-

ted a peaoeful, industrious and respeoted element in their
oommun1ties whioh could not oonceivably be suspected of barboring the tnhuman designs attri.buted to their raoe.

More-

over, many of them wielded oonsiderable influenoe and they
oommanded a number of votes whioh might be sufficient to determine the issue in a oruoial eleotion.
36

Lloyd George, II, 117.

Weighing all the

~~--------------------------------------------~
factors Inthe s1tuat1on, he reached the oonclus1on that In

1914 op1n1on In the United states was ne1ther pro-Ally
pro-German but pro-Amer1can.

~or

If, 1n the ma1n, the general

sympathy was wIth the Al11ed cause, 1t was not strong enough
for them to endure wlth patlence losses or 1nconvenience to
themselves or to Impose an obl,11gat1on to share 1n the confllct.

The ma1n Interest of Amer1ca was to malntaln her

trade, her prest1ge, the securlty of her cltlzens and to keep
her young men out of the shambles.

·She would be forced to

flght only If flghtlng was better calculated to defend these
37
1nterests than neutrallty.
The final problem of neutrallty to be consIdered here resulted from the d1fferent vIews held by the opposIng sets of
bellIgerents a s to the dutIes of a neutral.

Th1s led to con-

troversles, based on the sentIment stated above, that any of
our pract1ces wh1ch were advantageous to one country would be
equally as distasteful to her enem1es.

somethl~has

been

sald of the attltude of Great BrIta1n and our dIffIcultIes
w1th her w1ll be treated 1n more deta1l later.

But a word

should be sald here In regard to the German attItude toward
AmerIcan neutrallty.

Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador

at Wash1ngton, felt that at -the begInning of the European war
the people of Amerioa were predIsposed to a feel1ng of sympathy for the AllIes.
37

~-,

II, 113-115-

Thls he atbrlbuted to several thIngs:

the common l&nguage which opened the door to Engllsh political
and cultural influences; the convictlon held by many tl!at Germany was bent upon establlshing a world emplre; German attacks
upon the Monroe Doctrlne and flnally the hostllity of the Im.per1al German Government to the efforts of the United states
to br1ng about 1nternatlonal peace.

But , 1n sp1te of th1s

feeling, he felt that the general ind1fference that prevailed
in

re~rd

to all that happened 1n Europe, together w1th the

strong pac1fist fee11ng in the United states, would prevent
intervent1on'ln the host1l1t1es unless provoked by unforeseen
circumstances.

The greatest potent1al danger to fr1endly

relations between the two countries lay in the complete failure of the German government to understand the character of
the American people.

Bernstorff sald: "The American judges

affa1rs in Europe partly from the standpo1nt of his own private sentiment of justice and partly under the gu1dance of
merely emotional values; but not, as was generally supposed
in Germany, simply from a cold and businesslike point of view."
This lack of understand1ng, he felt, was responsible for Germany's complete inabi11ty to appreCiate the terrible effect
upon publ1c op1nion of the invasion of Belg1um and the slnking of the Lus1tan1&.38
..,
Pres1dent Wilson's declarat10n of neutral1ty, which was
38
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supported by American public opinion, was looked upon with sus-

picion by the German Government.

From the very beginn1ng the

charge was 'made that American neutrality was tinged with sympathy for the Allies.

This was denied by the President who

said that such an appearance was due to Great Britain's superior, naval force Which the United states could not alter.

This

argument did not satisfy Germany who soon became convinced
that the neutrality of the united states

tt •••

was a mere hypo-

crisy, and that all kinds of pretexts were found for helping
England. tt

39

The most perplexing of the problems which arose was that
over the sale of munitions to the Allied Governments.

In

this case Bernstorff admitted that Germany bad no real legal
basis for complaint.

40

The right of private individuals to

make and sell munitions of war had been approve,d at the Hague
Conference of 1907 at the suggestion Of the German delegate.
Regardless, however, of the evident legalitY of the American
position, the German Government continued to protest.

They

claimed that the munitions industry was delivering its wares
only to the enemies of Germany and their theoretical readiness
to do the same for Germany, if transportation was possible,
did not alter the case.

The claim wa s made tha t a real desire

to maintain honorable neutrality would involve the prohibition
39

Ibid., 67

40 Ibid.,

~l,

of this one-Sided traffic.

Intense bitterness of feeling was

aroused 1n Germany over this issue.

A vivid illustration of

the prevalent hatred toward America is furnished by the
Kaiser's

refusal~

contrary to all diplomatic practice, to re-

ceive the American Ambassador.

In answer to a protest in re-

gard to this unusual procedure he replied:

ttl

have nothing

aga1nst Mr. Gerard personally but I 11'111 not see the Ambassador of a country which furnishes arms and ammunitions to the
enemies of Germany.·'

41

The charges of .partiality made by Germany were echoed 1n a
much milder form by the American Secretary of State.

The

question of foreign policy occasioned the first real disagreement between him and the Chief Executive.

Bryan took the po-

sition that all belligerents should receive exactly the same
treatment from the Un1ted States.
warfare~

Germany~

1n her submarine

was inhuman to the last degree but he felt that she

was no more culpable than England who cut off food supplies
from the women a.nd children of the Central powers.

Both

countries were violating OUr neutral rights and he warned
that " ••• denunciation of one and s1lence for the other will
42
be construed by some as partiality. tt
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-Chapter III
The Controversy over

Ne~tral

Rights

The earliest and most continuous of the difficulties, which
beset President Wilson in the maintenance of his policy of
strict neutrality grew out of the interferenCe by the belligerents with American shipping.

By force of the circum-

stances which, quite early in the conflict, gave Great Britain
control of the seas the major portion of the controversy was
carried on with that government.

Eecause of her naval super-

iority it was comparatively easy for Great Britain to stop all
direct trade with Germany in artioles of absolute oontraband,
that is, articles exclusively tor military use.

The right ot

seizure of this type of goods was so well recognized that very
few complioations arose in oonnection with it.

Moreover, the

Allies were so inadequately prepared to produce munitions that
they turnished a practically unlimited market for all that
could be produced in the United states.

Inability, therefore,

to furnish these materials to the Central Powers produced no
economio hardship on American manufaoturers.
Conditional contraband, on the other hand, was a constant
source of trouble.

Allied control of the sea did not extend

to the Baltic region and could not prevent German trade with
the neighboring neutral states of sweden, Denmark and Holland.

~e

a consequence, the Brltlsh pollcy ln regard to condltlonal

~ontraband.

was formulated for the purpose of cuttlng ort every

posslble souroe of German supplles.
~o

Great Brltaln's refusal

aocept the Declaratlon of London wlthout modlfloatlon was

(ollowed by Orders ln Counol1 extendlng the llsts of both ab-

.

1

gO lute
~~r

and oondltlonal contraband.

Durlng the course of the

flfteen proclamatlons tor this purpose were made and the

11.st Of contraband extended to lnclude two hundred and thlrty
2
a~tlcles-

By Aprll 13, 1916 the 1lsts of absolute and con-

d1.tlonal contraband had been comblned as, ln the eyes of the
Government,the dlstlnctlon between the two olasses
3
hP-d ceased to have any value.
B~ltlsh

Although each extenslon brought protests from those ln the
u~lted

states whose lnterests were affeoted, the general rlght

ot a belllgerent to mOdlfy the 11sts of contraband was upheld
b1 thls government.
p~otestlng

In reply to a letter from Senator Stone

Great Brltaln's disregard of the deflnltions of con-

1

~rltlsh Orders ln Councl1, Aug. 4, 1914; sept. 21, 1914;
oct. 29, 1914, Dec. 23, 1914; March 11, 1915- Amerlcan
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traband contained in the Declaration ot London, Bryan pOinted
out that the Declaration ot London had not been

adopted~and

that there was no general agreement between nations as to the
articles which were to be regarded as contraband.
practice of belligerents to

decla~e

It was the

the articles which would

be considered as contraband and in this situation the r1ghts
of belligerents and neutrals were inevitably opposed.

He

further stated that the record of the United states in the
past had not been free from criticism.

UWhen neutral this

government has stood fora restr1cted list of absolute and
conditional contra. ba.nd~

As a belligerent we have contended

for a liberal list according,to our conceptions of the necess4ties of the case."

4

Nor had the united states any grounds for complaint in regard to the Allies' application of the doctrine of "continuous
voyage" to prevent passage of goods to Germany through neutral
countr1es.

In doing this, 'they were merely following the pre-

cedent set by the United states dur1ng the Civil War, when this
country exercised the right to determine from circumstances
whether the ostensible was the real destination.

Because of

the impl1cat1ons of' these earl1er poliCies, the Governaent of'
the Un1ted States was not free to take action against all of
4

Wil11am Jennings Bryan, ttReply to Senator stone Regarding
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the commercial restrictions wbich were causing inconvenience
to the American people.
must re~lize that:

It • • •

They, as well as the Government,
some ot the doctrines which a.ppear to

bear harshly upon neutrals at the present time are analagous
to or outgrowths trom policies adopted by the United states
when it was a belligerent.

The government cannot, therefore,

consistently protest against the application ot rules wh1ch
it has lollowed in the past unless they have not been practiced as heretofore. It

5

The recognition of these principles did not, however, prevent many serious conflicts between the two governments.
As the war progressed, the methods employed by Great Britain
in enforcing her naval policy, as well as her ever-widening
interpretation of contraband, occasioned many protests from
the American Government.

very soon after the opening of the

war, certain areas surrounding Germany and her Allies had been
designated as "war zones" and had been made unnaVigable by
means of fixed mines.
retalia~ion

This policy was explained as an act of

against Germany tor having scattered floating

mines in the path ot British commerce.

Use of the North Sea

was not forbid4en to neutral vessels, but they were warned to
use the lanes of naVigation through these areas which were
kept tree of mines by Brit1sh patrols.

Th1s gave Great Bri-

tain absolute control over all trade with the Northern Euro-

5
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pean neutrals and made it possible for British vessels to stop
all neutral ships and take them into British ports for 1Jearch.
On December 26, 1914, the Government of the United states
made its flrst vigorous protest against the Lselzure on the
hlgh se$S of a large number of vessels, laden with Amerlcan
,

.

,10 .;.,

goods destined to neutral ports, and their retention in British ports for long periods of time.

In this note the United

States Government polnted out that pea,e, not war,was the normal relation between nations and that the commerce between
countrles which are not belllgerents should not be lnterfered
with by those at war unless such interference is manlfestly
an imperatlve necesslty to protect their national safety, and
then only to the extent that it ls a necesslty.

The selzure

of cargoes of foodstuffs and other articles which were admittedly relative contraband, on the meresuspiclon that they
were destined for an enemy of Great Brltaln, was condemned in .,..,
the follOWing passage:
"In spite of the presumption of innocent use
because destined to neutral territory, the
British authorities have made these selzures
and detentions wlthout, so far as we are informed, being in possession of facts whlch
warranted a reasonable bellef' that the shipmInts bad in reality a belligerent destination, as that term is used in internatlonal
law.
Mere susplcion is not evidence and
doubts should be resolved in favor gf neutral commerce and not against 1 t."
6

Congressional Record, Lll, 1487-88.

r __----------------------------------------------.
The note finally complained of the injury to American commerce
as a whole because ot the hazards of the enterprise an! t he repeated diversions of goods from long established markets.
In answer to the protest of the United states, the British
Foreign Minister expressed his Government's unwillingness to
interfere with trade which was of a ttbona fide" neutral character.

At the same time, he said the. t the Allies were con-

fronted with the growing danger that neutral countries contiguous to the enemy would become abase of supplies for the
armed torces ot the enemy and tor materials for manufacturing
armament.

In support ot this statement, he cited figures to

show the tremendous increase ot exports, from the United
states to the neutral countries ot North Europe, in November,
7
1914, over those ot November, 1913.
The British Government
felt that its national safety depended upon the interception
of goods really destined for the enemy and refused to accede
to the demands ot the United states that search for such goods
should be made at sea and not 1n the ports ot one ot the bel11gerents.
Thfs interchange ot notes was the beginning of a long and
voiuminous correspondence Which cont1nued to the time that the
Un1ted

s~tes

severed diplomatic relations with Germany.

this controversy, according to LanS1ng, every pr1nc1ple and

7
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In

.

rule of international law a.pplicable to naval warfare was 1nvoked by one government or the other and became the subject of
debate and argument.

There was no definite code, no fixed

standard, wh1ch could be applied.

Everything seemed to be

vague and uncertain by reason of the new conditiuns, though
8
the long recognized principles were in fact unaffected. As the British became more and more severe in dealing with
ships and cargoes destined to neutral ports, from Which transshipment to Germany was pOSSible, American shipp1ng and 1ndustrial interests became exceedingly 1rritated and indignant at
the treatment they were receiving.

They bombarded the De-

partment of state w1th compla1nts and demanded that the Gov-'
ernment take steps to protect their rights and save them from
financial loss.

9

Their dissatisfaction was aggravated by the

grOWing suspicion that Great Britain was actuated by other motive. than merely the prevent10n of goods reaching Germany
through neutral countr1es.

American bus1ness interests were

becoming convinced that, under the pretext of national necess10
1ty, a definite effort was be1ng made to kill Amer1can trade.
~he

extent to which President Wilson was willing to accede

to the demands of the commerc1al interests 1n his protests to
Great Br1ta1n, seems t'o have been 11mited by his own personal
8
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10
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conv1ctions.

Tumulty, who was intimately associated with the

Pres1dent all through the war, 1s of the op1nion that odiy

the

be11ef that it was his duty to rule according to the will of
the people kept h1m, after the violation of Belg1an neutral-

.

ity, from champion1ng thecause which he
. felt involved the c1vi'

l1zation of the world.

..,

"It was his devotion to the idea of

trusteesh1p that held him in check, and the consciousness that
in carrying out that trusteesh1p he

no right to permit his
-.
11
own pass10nate feelings to govern his public acts."
A few
ha~.

weeks after the opening of host1l1ties, he stated" to Tumulty
that the war would s.oon resolve itself 1nto a struggle between
autocracy and democracy and that the Un1ted States could" not
12
remain isolated.
When the off1cial action taken by the
Government failed to satisfy the commerc1al interests and the
German sympathizers, who were clamoring for a firmer and more
dec1s1ve att1tude toward England, he refused to accede to
demands.

thei~

He charged that many of the senators and congressmen

who were urging him to t.keradical act10n against England were
merely try1ng to influence German votes 1n the1r districts and
had no thought of the calamitous results of "a breach between
England and

~he

Un1ted States.

He felt that he had gone the

l1mit in pressing the claims of the Un1ted States but that

~ng-
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land, in the throes of 'a world crisis, must be given a chance
to adjust these matters.

Sir Edward Grey's contention -that

England was fighting America's fight to save civilization was
in accord with his own views as stated to Tumulty:
ttEngland is fighting our fight and you may
well understand that I shall not, in the
present state of world affairs, place obstacles in her way. Many of our critics
suggest war With England in order to force
reparation in these matters. War with England would result in a German triumoh. No
matter what may happen to me personally in
the next election, I will not take aDY action to embarass England ncin she is fighting for her life and the life of the world.
Let those who clamor for radical action
against England understand this."
13
~he

President's determination not to precipitate a crisis

with England was ably seconded by Lansing Who, first as UnderSecretary and later as Secretary of state, was responsible for
most of the notes sent to the belligerents.

As previously

stated, he early became convinced that ultimately the United
States would intervene on the side of the Allies and he felt,
therefore, that her differences with England must never reach
a point where diplomatic correspondence would give place to
action.

Moreover, the United States ,must not enter the war

too closely bound by what had been written beforehand.
sumabl~when

pre-

she became a partiCipant in the conflict, she

would Wish to adopt many of the policies and practices

a~inst

which she was now protesting, for her aim then would be that of
13
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the Allies, namely to effect· the ,economio isolation of Ger-many.

Lansing stated that he never lost sight of

this~posSi

bility during the oontroversies conoerning the British restraints on our trade.

His notes, therefore, became long

and exhaustive treatises deSigned to open up new subjects for
discussionrather than close those in controversy.

Beoause

short and decisive notes were dangerous, he worked with the
deliberate purpose of keeping the controversy open and the
questions unsettled, in order that the United States would be
free to act, even illegally if necessary, when she -entered
the war.

The execution of this policy presented many diffi-

cult problems.

On the one hand was the ever-increa.sing

pressure from American bus1ness men, acting through their
Senators and representat1ves and other officials, to do something drastic to relieve our commercial interests from Br1tish interference.

On the other hand, there was Lanslng's

own conviction that, beca.use the United States would eventually be at war with Germany, its difficulties with E~land
. 14
must never be allowed to proceed to an open rupture.
The policy of Wilson and the state Department in protesting every violation of our neutral rights was vigorously opposed by the American Ambassador at London.

During the

entire period from 1914 to 1917, he was engaged 1n a campaign
whlch he called

at waglng

14
Lan~ing,

128-9.

neutrality. tt

His conception of the

term was entirely at variance with that of President Wilson's
and involved the maintenance of an outward neutrality a1id at
the same time the exertion of pressure on Washington in behalf
of the Allies.

15

He complained bitterly of the policy of the

Government and characterized Lansing and the other members of
.' '.
16
the state Department as "library lawyers".
He believed
that the State Department had no conception of the real issue
involved, that the Administration at W\Shington was not representing the

~al

sentiments of the American people and that,

for political reasons or through a false appreeiation of the
vital interests at stake, it was sending unwarranted or at
least needless complaints and protests to London.

17

The

President was greatly irritated bY,the attitude of Page and
asserted that if he were to represent the American Government.
he must see the matters under discussion in the light in which'
18
they were seen in the United states.
The Administration was fully as anxious as page at this time
to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain but both the
President and Colonel House felt that it was essential for the
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united States to assert her rights as a neutral.

If she did

not do this in the case of the seizure of oargoes she

c~d

not

protest e ffeoti vely in case more serious attacks followed.
House expressed to Page his conviotion that there could not be
any serious trouble between England a.nd America, ..... with all
of us feeling as we do; but of course we must needs be oareful
in the manner of doing things - for the American people, as
you know, are exceedingly sensitive regarding oertain ques~ions,

and it would not be advisable for the President with

19
all his power and popularity to go counter to this sentiment.
Unfortunately Page seemed unable to grasp the American
pOint of view which Wilson was trying to uphold.

His let-

ters reveal his frank admiration of the English system and
from the very beginning of the war he urged Amerioan intervention on the side of the Allies.

20

He had little sympathy

with the preSident's refusal to reoognize the legality of the
blookade.

He was willing to make allowanoe for the British

restrictions on trade and seemed to feel that, in oomparison
with the defeat of Germany and the maintenance of good feeling between Great Britain and "America, the losses and inconveniences of neutrals were of minor importance.

The State

Department felt that its work was constantly hampered by this
19
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attltude of the Ambassador.

Mr. LansIng made t he apparent ly

.'

justIfIable oomplaint that Page:

" ••• seemed to have so lIttle conoeption of the
state of publIc opInIon In thIs oountry that
he, doubtless wIthout realIzIng It, disoounted
••• the Instruotions sent hIm by his own government by showing his personal dIsapproval of them
and by giving the Brltlsh offloials the impresslon
that it was needless to pay serlous attentIon to
the numerous co~lalnts whlch he was dlreoted to
~y~~ret~~

a

..

There oan be llttle doubt that Page's inslstence that the
communloatlons of the state Department dld not represent the
real Ane rloan sentlment,

1m s

an lmportant faotor in stiffen-

ing the Brltish resistanoe to the American demands.

But, at

the same tIme, the BrItish Foreign Offioe was fully aware of
the danger of pushlng the Unlted states too far.

SIr Edward

Grey reallzed tnem the beglnning the lmportanoe of the attltude of the United States.

He reasoned tba t by virtue of 1 ts

large population and with resouroes greater than those of any
other country, the United States could do whatever it felt to
be right or desirable Without fear of the oonsequenoes.

This

country beoame, therefore, a faotor of such great importanoe
that its attitude might bedeoisive in determIning the suooess
22

of either side.

If Great Britain secured Amerioan sympathy

and support she could win.

The loss of that sympathy might

even result in throwing Amerioan support to Germany and in21

Lansing, saturday Evening Post, April 18, 1931.
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volve almost certaln defeat for the Allles.

Thls convlctlon

.'

became the basls of Grey's pollcy and he was determlned to
shape hls course so as to wln the support of the United states.
The problems lnvolved are stated very clearly ln hls Memoirs:
" ••• the blockade of Germany was essentlal to the
Victory ofthe Allles, but the 111-19'111 of the
Unlted States meant their certaln defeat. After
Pa~ls had been saved by the battle of the Marne,
the Allies could do no more than hold their own
agalnst Germany; sometlmes they dld not even do
that.
Germany and Austria were self-supportlng
in the huge supply of munltlons.
The Allles
soon became dependent tor an adequate suppl,
upon the United States_
It we quarreled wlth
the United States we could not get that 8~ply.
It was better, therefore, to carryon the war
wlthout blockade, if need be, than to incur a
break with the Unlted States about contraband
and thereby deprlve the Allles of the resources
necessary to carryon the war at all or wlth
any chance of success.
The object of dlplomacy, therefore, was to secure the maxlmum ot
blockade that could be enforced wlthout a rupture with the Unlted states." 23
Grey reallzed that the executlon ot thls polley placed
Great Brltaln on very dellcate and debatable ground.

Having

superlor sea-power, she lnterpreted lnternatlonal law ln a
manner tha.t would permlt the maxlmum of lnterference wlth
goods destlned to the enemy.

Thls lnvolved two steps: first,

all articles that were essentlal to modern warfare mpat be
made absolute contraband; second and more lmportant, the
United States must accept the llst.

Grey mentloned the

Unlted States partlcularly because lt was the only neutral

23
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that could effectively d1spute the list and 1t was presumed
that the other neutrals would accept any list that thi8e'country accepted.

The att1tude of the United states, therefore,

became of supreme 1mportance.

She might reasonably be ex-

pected to dispute listing as contraband articles Which in
previous times had been of little or no use to arm1es but
were now essential to them.

Inasmuch as these articles were

of general use for ordinary commercial enterprises it was felt
that they should not be put in the same class as munitions.
To increase the possibil1ty of acceptance by the United
States, the British Government decided to mak8 the list

co~

paratively short at first and increase it as circumstances'
24
warranted.
This extension of the list until it included
some of the most important articles of American export, accompanied by an ever more severe control over trade with neutrals, formed the basis of the controversy which continued
until our final break with Germany.
In spite of the very eVident desire on both sides of the
Atlantic to preserve amicable relations, by the spring of 1915
the United States was becoming so irritated by Great Britain's
high-handed interference with our neutral rights that affairs
were rapidly approaching a crisis.

This was averted only by

a new development in the war which, for the time being at
least, thrust our difficulties with England into the back24
Grey, II, 109.

ground.

From the beg1nn1ng of the war Germany, due to the

infer10r1ty of her surface sh1pp1ng, had placed her maiA re11anoe for 1njurfng thecanmeroe of the Allies upon the submar1ne.
She now proposed to extend th1s polioy and render 1t more effeative.

Accord1ngly, on February 4, 1915, the German Ad-

miralty issued a proclamation declaring that the waters surrounding Great Br1ta1n and Ireland would henceforth be com25
prised within the seat of war.
After February 18 the German navy would endeavor to destroy all enemy merchant vessels
found w1thin th1s area notw1thstanding the fact that this'
pract1ce might involve the destruct10n of 11ves and property.
Neutral nations were warned not to entrust passengers, cargoes or crews to such vessels and neutral vessels were warned
to steer clear of these waters.

The German Navy bad rece1ved

instruct10ns.to absta1n from all violence against neutral
vessels but it was felt that the use of neutral flags by the
bel11gerents might make it imposs1ble to prevent a neutral
from becoming the vic.t1m of an a tta.ck intended for the enemy.
Th1s proclamation injected a new element into.the s1tuation.
Up to this time the quest10n involved had been the capture,
retention and possible confiscation of vessels and cargoes.
The new German po11cy meant their absolute destruction and an
almost certa1n loss of life.

These facts with their serious

possibilit1es were called to the attention of the German Gov.25papers Relating to the Foreign Rela.tions of the Un1ted States
1915, Supplement, The World War, Washington, Government
Printing Office, 19 28, 94.

ernment.

In a note dated February 10, 1915, the United States

warned Germany that the destruction of Amerioan veasels·'or the
loss of American lives would be considered an indefensible violation of neutral rights for whioh this Government would hold
26
Germany to striot acoountabilityIn the course of the subsequent diplomatic interchange, the German Government announced
that its new and drastio policy was a retaliatory measure and
Was undertaken to break the British blockade upon foodstuffs
27
ana to cut off the British supply of munitions.
In view of
the emergency the United states proposed to both Governments
a modus vivendi whioh, it frankly admitted, was based upon expedienoy rather than legal right.

It proposed: the entry of

foods to Germany, solely for the use of non-combatants; restric
tions upon floating mines; the 'discontinuanoe of the use of neutral flags by belligerent vessels; and that neither Germany
nor Great Britain should use submarines to attack merchant ves28
sels exoept to enforce the right of visit and aearoh.
This
proposal was aeoepted oonditionally by Germany but was refused
29
by Great Britain.
Ambassador page, in a telegram to the
Secretary ot state, described the English reaction to the efforts of the United states.

He stated that: tIThe feeling
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"'to

in official and unofficial life is that our pacific intentions
and our lack of appreciation of what the war means have·'led us
to play into Germany's' hands.

Whatever may be ,aaid or

thought of this English opinion, it is clear that the British
this move on our part as well-intentioned meddling and
. '.
30
it lessens their respect for our Judgment."
re~rd

The failure of this proposal was followed by a more aggressive program on the part of both

~lligerents.

Great

Britain issued new Orders in Council which constituted in ef31
fect a blockade of neutral ports.
The United states denied
the legality of these measures, maintaining that if carried
into effect they would amount to a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce Within the
Whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the
32
sovereign rights of na. tions now at peace.
Irritating
though this policy was, it was conducted without actual loss
of vessels, cargoes, or passengers.

In contrast, the activi-

ties of the German submarines seemed to violate all the princi-

,

ples of humanity.
Within the next few months several American ships were sunk
by German s"Ibmarines and a number of American lives were lost.
30

~.,

134-
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....

popular feeling in the United states became tinged with bitterness toward Germany.

English officials on the other hand,

oonsidered that the German U..boat oampaign was of the greatest
assistance to their cause inasmuch as it turned American irritation from the British naval policy to the German outrages.
Moreover, the tension which now developed between the United
Sta tes and Germany enabled England to increase the stringency
of her blockade without straining her precarious relations
33
with the United States to the breaking polnt.
The immediate danger of a quarrel with England was averted
by the sinking, on May 7, 1915, of the Britlsh liner,

~

tania, with a loss of one hundred twenty four Amer1can citizens.

Resentment against Germany became so intense as to

bring in America the first general demand for war.

The tone

of the President's notes to Germany during the preceding
months bad led many to believe that he would immediately adopt
decisive measures.

The German Ambassador felt that the force

of public opinion and the hostility to Germany aroused by th1s
disaster would force the President to break off diplomatic relations.

Such a course, he was convinced, would 1nevitably

lead to war.
six days.

34-

Wilson took no action, however, for a period of

During this time, Tumulty stated, his calmness in
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,

.
~

the face of clamorous demands for war

b~ught

accusations of

35

heartlessness and indif.ference to the terrible tragedy ...

But Wilson felt that his refusal to act hastily was Justified
by the necessity of considering his first step in the most
careful manner, for once having taken it he could not withdraw.

He

again stressed his obligation to evaluate, to the

best of his ability, the feeling of the country.

He was

uncertain whether the current emotionalism of the people would
endure until a special session of Congress could be called
upon to sustain any radical action he might take.
to act in conformity with the

wi~l

His desire

of the people he expressed

in the following words:
tiThe vastness of this country; its variegated
elements; the conflicting cross currents of
national fee11ngs bid us wait and w1thhold
ourselves from hasty and precipitate action.
When we move against Germany we must be certain that the whole country not only moves
with us but is Willing to go forward to the
end.
I know that we shall be condemned for
wa1ting, but in the last analysis, I am the
trustee of this nation, and the cost of it
all must be considered in the reckoning before we go forward. tt 36
President Wilson's fear that public opinion would not support warlike measures was shared by Lansing.

The intense ex-

citement of the East was not so evident in the Central and
Western sections of the country.

35
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In these regions resentment

1f8,S

qualified by arguments in regard to the Wisdom of American

travel on British vessels and the right of Germany to aQopt
retaliatory measures against Great Britain.

Jud.g1ng from the

comments in the press LanSing concluded tba t public opinion

was by no means unified but that the ue.Jority of the people
were opposed to measures tba t would lead to war.

37

The prob-

able correctness of this conclusionwas verified by secretary
of

Agric~lture

Houston who was traveling in the West at the

time of the sinking of the Lusitania.

He stated that to the

people of the West the war seemed very far away and, although.
they wanted the rights of the United States safeguarded, they
did not seriously contemplate the possibility of becoming in38
volved in the struggle.
The long controversy between the United States and Germany
Which followed the sinking of the !tusi tan1a cannot be treated
adequately here.

The limitations of this paper make impos-

sible any detailed discussion of the issues involved and hence
only th9se aspects of' the case which bave a bearing upon AngloAmerican relations may be touched on.

The first formal action

taken by the United States took the form of a note of protest
sent to the German Government on May 13, 1915.
37

39

The answer
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to th1s note was so evaslve and unsat1sfaotory that Pres1dent
Wilson felt that a more vigorous expression of the

of

pos~tion

the United States was necessaFY'.
Houston has given a very
,
detailed aooount of the Cabinet meeting of June 1, at whioh
the President presented the draft of his reply to Qermany.
Bryant s demand for a strong note to England also, protesting
against her

ille~l

action in holding up our exports, was op-

posed by the other Cabinet members.

They denounced the ldea

that material interests should be considered during a disoussion which involved so serious a matter as human lives.
Bryan's oharges that the Cabinet was pro-Ally were denied by
the President.

He sald that the Unlted States bad sent a

note to England and might do so again at the proper t1me, but
that th1s was a s1ngularly 1nappropr1ate t1me to take up such
a matter with her.

In view of the ser10usness of the 1ssue

w1th Germany, W1lson felt it would be folly to foroe matters
~

.

w1th England.

.

seoretary of Commeroe Redfield pOinted out

tha. t Bryan erred when he said that England had s topped our exports.

F1gures were oi ted to show that the export trade of

the Unlted States was greater than ever and was grow1ng.

The

praotically unanimous view of the other Cabinet members that
Amerioan trade was flourishing 1n sp1te of Eng11sh regulat10ns,
failed to impress Bryan40

Houston, I, 137.

41

The final draft of the President's note called Germany's
attention to the fact that the Government of the UnitedrStates
was " ••• contending for something muoh greater than mere rights
of property or privileges of commeroe.

It 1s contending for

nothing less high and sacred than the rights of hu.manity,
which every Government honors itself in respecting and which
no government is justified in resigning on behalf of those
.
42
under its care and authority."
Bryan, who was opposed to
the United States becoming a participant in the European
struggle, resardless of the offenses, reSigned rather than
sign this note which he felt was only a Prelude to war.

43

The unwillingness of Germany to reoognize the principles
for which Wilson was contending served to keep the situation
oritical all during the summer of 1915.

A break with Ger-

many was avoided only because of the president's determination
to first exhaust all possible means of reaching an understanding.

His efforts met with a degree of success althw:gh, in

faot, the Lusitania case was never definitely settled and remaIned a dIsturbing element of our international relations
all during our period of neutrality.

The immediate contro-

versy was, however, terminated on September 1, by Germany's
pledge that

It • • •

li.ners will not be sunk by our submarInes

without warning and wIthout safety of the lives of noncombat42

43
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ants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or otter
44
resistance.

.'

The failure ot the President to bre.ak otf relations with
Germany was a bitter disappointment to Ambassador page.

His

letters during the summer and autumn ot 1915 were tull of complaints in regard to the course adopted by the administration.
He held that the practice of writing notes to the German Government instead of immediately dismissing its ambassador had
resulted in a complete revulsion of English feeling towards
the United States.

The conviction was becoming general that

the United States would submit to any indignity without resentment and was pledged to a

peac~ ~t

Writing to Colonel House, he stated
1t • • •

any price policy.

empha~ically

that

British opinion and the British.Government have abso-

lutely lost their respect tor us and their former high estimate of the President.

And that former respect is gone tor
45
.
good unless he acts now very quickly."
House, on the other hand, defended the president's motives.

He argued that the charge ot timidity was not justified because resistance to the popular excitement ot the East required an exceptional amount ot courage and subjected Wilson
to many months ot deep anxiety and humiliation.

His slowness

to take deci.ive action and his willingness·to negotiate were

44
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slmply the result of hls unshakeable convlctlon that he was
under obllgatlon to the American people to keep out of·the
46
war unless the Germans definitely forced it upon him.
The Brltish Forelgn Offlce was a.pprised ot the views of the
Presldent and the attitude of the American people by House.
Shortly after the second Lusitania note he wrote that the vast
majorlt y of the people deslred the President to be flrm with
J
47
Germany but yet avold war.
Some tlme later he reported
I

that the sentlment of the country contlnued to be agalnst war
and 1 t was doubtful whe.ther the presldent would be sust.,lned
by Congress If he advocated drastie actlon.

In thls sa.me

letter he warned Grey that if the immedla te tension between
Germany and the United States should be relieved, a demand
for an adjustment of our shlpplng troubles wlth England would
lmmediately arise.

48

Grey received a slmilar warning from

the Britlsh Ambassador at Washlngton, who said that after the
passlng of the German crlsis it would be the turn of the Allles.

In regard to the American note which was being sent

he stated that

tt •••

feeling in the Government clrcles seems to

be that the Unlted states

mu~t

defend thelr rights and they

must make a good showlng before Congress meets, but that the
correspondence, should not take a hostlle character but should

46
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be in the nature of a juridical discussion."

49

He also ad-

vised his government that inasmuch as England was usine(' this
country as a base of supplies and had just floated a loan here
it would probably be good policy, if not an absolute necessity,
to make some concessions to American opinion •

.

,9 .,

The note mentioned by Spring-Rice was sent on October 21,
1915, and firmly stated the American objections to the restrictions of the Allies.

Page complained.of its tone, saying

that it contained " ••• not a courteous word, not a friendly
phrase, nor a kindly turn, not an allusion even to an old acquaintance, to say nothing of an old friendship, not a word of
thanks for courtesies or favours done us, not a hint of sympathy in the difficulties of the time.

There is nothing in

its tone to show that it came from an American to an English50
man ••• "
In spite of the firmness of the tone, however,
;

the note produced no change in Great Britain's policy.

Grey

,.,

stated the English point of view in a letter to Colonel
51
House.
Compliance with the American demands would, in the
eyes of the British Government, be tantamount to giving up,
definitely and openly, any attempt to stop 'goods from entering
Germany through neutral ports.

•

The friction and trouble which

developed made Grey personally desire to give up the
49
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.

of blockade as practiced by Great BrItain but such a step
would materially lessen the cha.nce of Allied success.

·'The

real question, he felt, was not concerned with legal niceties
about contraband, but was whether England could continue to
use the weapon of sea power which the United States was noW
threatening to strike from her hand.
The persistent refusal of Great Britain to recognize the
American position resulted in a change of opinion on the part
of President Wilson.

During the years 1915 and 1916 he grew

more and more impatient With what he termed the "intolerable
conditionsot neutrality."

52

The diplomatic surrender ot

Germany in the cases of the Lusitania and the Sussex caused
the attention ot the Administration to be concentrated upon
our commercial troubles.

Moreover, the cold reception given

by England to his proposals tor peace apparently led Wilson
to the conclusion that the war aims ot the Allies were as
selfish as those of Germany_

53

Spurred on by demands in

Congress tor immediate and decisive pressure on the Allies,
he instructed Colonel House to inform the British Foreign Office that the United states was faced with the necessity of
taking some detinite action immediately.

52

In his opinion

Letter from Wilson to House, Nov. 24, 1916, Yale House
Collection, Cited by Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy
during the World war, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1934,

79.
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only two courses were open to th1s country.

The f1rst 'was to

make a def1n1te move for peace upon some permanent

In

bas1~

the event of the fa1lure of this f1rst plan the United states
would ins 1st to the 11mit upon her r1ghts of trade and upon
the freedom of the seas as defined by 1nternat10nal law.

If

forced to th1s second course, the American position would be
asserted with the same pla1n speaking and firmness that was
used against Germany.

54

The reluctance of Great Britain to consider peace proposals
at this time and her refusal to give up the blockade led Wilson to give serious cons1deration to the idea of imposing an
embargo upon exports to the Al11ed countr1es.

'l'h1 s wa s gen-

erally recognized as ·the most effective weapon in the
~on

posses~

of the United states and its use at any time would have

resulted in a complete change of policy on the part of Grea"t
Britain.

The reluctance of the President and his advisers to

resort to 1t cannot be attributed ent1rely to their friendsh1p
and sympathy with England which made them loath to hamper her
effect1 veness against Germany.

They were also acutely con-

sc10us at all times of the effect of such a step upon the economic life of the nation.

Commerc1ally we had always been

bound more closely w1th England than with an, other country.
Drastic act10n at this time, though it might accomp11sh its

54
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immediate objeotive, would undoubtedly upset oommeroial relations between the two oountries for some time to oome.·House
stresses this point in July, 1915, when he wrote to the President: "In regard. to our shipping troubles with Great Britain,
I believe that if we press balM enough they will go to almost
any length rather than oome to the breaking point.

But, in

so dOing, we would gain their eternal resentment for having
taken advantage of their position and our aotion would arise
to haunt us - not only at the peaoe oonferenoe but for a oentury to follow ••• lf it oame to the last analysis and we plaoed
an embargo upon munitions of war and foodstuffs to please the
ootton men, our whole industrial and agricultural machinery
would ory out against it. "55
Another reason equally important was the faot that the war
orders ot the Allies had oreated a time of great prosperity
in the United States.

A break with the Allies would endanger

this large and profitable trade and might induoe a oommeroial
criSis.

The British Government was kept informed of this sit-

uation by its Ambassador at Washington.

In one report to

his superiors, he stated that : "The brutal facts are that this
oountry has been saved by the war, and by our war demand, from
a great oommercial orisis; that in normal times Great Britain
and her colonies take forty per oent ot the total export trade
of the United States.

55

We have, therefore, the claims of their

seymour, Intimate Papers, II, 58.

-best customer and,

at the present moment our orders here are
56
absolutely essent1al to the1r econom1c prosperity."
~eports suoh as this, undoubtedly, were a very important faotor
in help1ng Great Britain to determine just how far resistanoe
to American demands could be carr1ed without induc1ng retal1atory measures.
When American sympathy showed s1gns of becoming al1enated
from the cause of the Al11es and ag1tat1on for an embargo increased, Spring-R1ce sent another very s1gn1f1cant report to

Grey.

In appra1sing the possibilities of aotion by the

United states, he stated:
tiThe reason why there has been no embargo on arms
and ammunition is not sympathy with us, but the
sense that the prosperity of the country, on
which the administration depends for its existenoe,
would be imperilled by such a measure.
If there
is a scarcity of mater1al or any other reason why
an embargo would pay, we should have an embargo.
At present I don't see any ohance of it unless
there is a change in the conditions.
But lesser
measures may be put into fDrce.
Res~raints on
shipping may be ordered.
Transport may be impeded.
We are not seA loan may be made more difficult.
cure against such measures.
Therefore, we must
watch very oarefully what is oocurring here.
Do
not depend on official reports. But obtain independent informat1on from as many sides as possible.
The object should be to asoertain when the breaking point is near and where.
There may be a
breaking point.
Do not deoeive yourself a s to
that.
If it aiproaches you may have to oonoede
57
a point or two.
56
57
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During 1916 relations between the United States and Great
Britain became steadily worse.

But each time that the·break-

ing point seemed imminent, Germany intervened to draw attention from the dispute in progress.

A new crisis developed,

however, with the publication on July 18 of a black list of
American firms with which Allied firms were forbidden to
58
trade.
This appeared to Wilson to be the last straw. . He
informed House that his patience was exhausted and that he was
considering asking Congress for authority to prohibit loans
and to restrict exportation of supplies to the Allies.

59

This

step was actually taken and before its adjournment in september, two very significant measures were passed by Congress.
In the first place, Congress conferred upon the President authority to inaugurate an embargo upon munitions and other
articles needed by the Allies.

And secondly, a huge appro-

priation was made to provide for a vast ship-building program.
This appropriationwas suffioient for the oonstruotion of one
hundred thirty five vessels of all classes.

With such an

addition the navy of the United states would have been in a
position to dispute with Great Britain for the command of the

58
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seas.

House warned the president of the dangers that were

inherent in such a program.

Wilson's irritat10n with

~reat

Britain 1s ev1denced by h1s reply: ttLet us bu1ld a navy b1g60
ger than theirs and do What we please. 1t
These weapons for

enfo~cing

respect for the neutral rights

and the sovereign power of the United states were not, however, put into effect.

Just at the time that the s1tuation

between the United states and the Allies was apparently becoming intolerable, Germany injected into the war the element
of unrestricted submar1ne warfare.

As a result ot this pol-

icy of desperation the United states not only submerged her
trade dispute with the Allies, but ult1mately espoused their
cause and became an active part1cipant 1n the war.

60
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Chapter IV
President Wilson's Attempts at Mediation
All through the trying period of neutrality President Wil-

.

son in his relations with both sets O~·~lligerentsShaped his
foreign policy along two main lines.

In the first place, his

allegiance to the principles which form:d the cornerstone of
the traditional foreign policy of the United states prompted
him to use every effort to keep the country out of the European war.

And secondly, his own devotion to humanitarian

ideals incited in him the desire to direct his own energy and
the power and influence of the United States to the task of
bringing peace to the warring nations.
Although attempting to carry out both policies simultane;

ously, the methods employed in each ease were somewhat dissimilar.

In questions involving our rights as a sovereign

power, the views of the President were generally conveyed to
the belligerent Governments through the State Department.
But his negotiations to bring about peace were of a more informal nature and were conducted, for the most part, outside

•

of the regular diplomatic channels.

The greater part of

~is

work, which of necessity was of a very delicate and confidential nature, was entrusted by President Wilson to his closest
friend, Colonel House, to whose Intimate Papers we must turn

as our most imPortant source of informat1on.

We cannot doubt

that, 1:"1 h1s negot1at1ons w1th the representatives of t1!e bel11gerent Governments, House was express1ng the v1ews and des1res of the Pres1dent.

Wilson, h1mself, attests the bond be-

tween them and the s1m11arity of the1r sympath1es and ideals_
Having been asked whether House represented him accurately 1n
a certa1n sltuat1on, he replied: "Mr. House 1s my second personality.

He ls my 1ndependent self.

mlne are one.

Hls thoughts and.

If I were in h1s place I would do just as he

suggested ••• lf anyone thlnks he 1s reflecting my op1nion by

"1

whatever act10n he takes, they are welcome to the conclus1on.
House was peculiarly fitted to carry out such a mlss10n by
reason of his 11fetime 1nterest 1n fore1gn affalrs and his
close assoclation with those in charge of our forelgn policy_
The Presldent had consulted h1m constantly 1n regard to appOintments to both the domestic and forelgn service and he was,
therefore, thrown lnto close contact with the Am"bassadors to
other countries.

He was always deeply lnterested ln the1r

problems and his cordlal relations With them expedlted the
work that he was commissioned to undertake.

H1s relations

with the forelgn dlplomats stationed at Washington were always
on a fr1endly and sometimes even an intimate basls.
1
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Dur-

ing the course of the war he made a polnt of keeplng ln close
touch wlth the Ambassadors of the belligerent powers. -In hls
diary he said: III am laying plans to make myself grata. to all
the nations lnvolved in this European War so that my services
may be utl1lzed to advantage and without objection in the
3
event a proper opportunlty arrives.
Unllke the President House was convinced that modern condltions, whlch had made the United states a world power, demanded the abandonment of the pollcy of isolation.

Bound more

closely, intellectually and commercially with Europe durlng
the last thirty years than at any time in her h1story, she had
incurred a.n obligation to actlvely particlpate in formulatlng
plans for the maintenance of the peace of the world.

But he

also felt that any movement for lnternational cooperat10n must
be based upon a close understanding between this country and
Great Britain.

Settlement of the difficult1es between them,

which were baaed chiefly upon mislnformation and misunderstandlng on both Sides, was imperative.

To accomplish this Presi-

dent W1lson and Colonel House employed a method which was
unlque 1n diplomatic history-

It was based on the ldea that

foreign policy ·could be conducted like personal buslness QY a
frank interchange of views in a spirit of honesty and friend4
liness.
In the British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey,

3

-Ibid.,

I, 322.

4
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I, 195-

House found a kindred spirit for whom he came to have a deep
affection and unbounded respect.

He considered him a !1plo-

mat distinguished by sincerity of purpose and honesty of method and one who did not regard diplomacy " ••• as a mysterious
intTigue, but rather as a means by which the representatives
of different states could discuss frankly the coinCidence or
the clash of national interests and reach a peaceable understanding."

5

The efforts of President Wilson and House to insure peace
in Europe really antedated the war.

Alarmed by the growing

tension between the nations of Europe, Wilson dispatched House,
in May 1914, on a mission designed to bring about a better understanding between England and Germany.

Negotiations to

effect this end were, however, abruptly terminated by the
events which culminated in the general European War.
ately after the

outb~ak

Immedi-

of the war, Wilson sent to each of the

belligerents a formal offer of mediation.

This offer was

merely an expression of his willingness to act in behalf of
European peace at the moment or " ••• at any other time that
6
might be thought more suitable ••• "
The replies of the belligerent Governments were equally formal acknowledgements of the
PreSident's offer of mediation and were productive of no results.

5
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6
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As a result of the many misunderstandings that developed
over our trade during the first months of the war and tHe apparent inability of Ambassador page to grasp the American
point of view,

~ilson

resqlved, early in 1915, to send House

to England to explain the American attitude.

A secondary

purpose of this mission was to determine the possibilities of
mediat1on.

Informal conversations held by House with Spring-

Rice and Bernstorff had given rise to the faint hope that the
time was ripe for an offer of mediation.

That such an under-

taking would be complicated in both England and Germany by the
strong anti-Amer1can sentiment which was developing, this Government was well aware.
give him great

ple~sure

Grey wrote that, although it would
to see and talk to House, it was most

1mportant that he should be cognizant Of the state of public
opinion in Engla.nd before embarking upon his mission.

The

policy of the United States Government of singling out Great
Britain as the only Power whose conduct merited protest was,
according to Grey,creating a very unfavorable impression on
the people of England.
port from Germany.

Ambassador Gerard sent a similar re-

He said tha t German re sentment against

American sales of munitions to the Allies was finding expression
in a veritable campaign of hate d1rected against America and
7
Americans.
Despite these disoouraging reports the undertaking was not

7
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abandoned.

Wilson and House both felt that every opportunity

which offered even the slightest chance to bring peace ehould
be seized.

30, 1915.

House accordingly sailed for England on January
He 1mmed1ately got in touch w1th Grey to whom he

proposed a peace conference to negot1ate a peace based upon
the evacuat10n and restoration of Belgium and a drast1c d1sarmament program to ensure permanent peace.

Grey signif1ed

that peace upon these terms would be satisfactory to England
but he feared that England's Allies would not accept a program which did not take their territorial aspirations into considera tion.

Grey also maintained that an essent1al element of

a settlement must be some general guaranty for world-wide peace.
British officials were inc11ned to be sceptical of the sincerity of the Germans, fee11ng that their military success precluded the acceptance of any peace terms that would be satisfactory to the Allies.

This feeling was intensified by the

German proclamation of February 4, in regard to the use of the
submarine.
House later visited Paris and Berlin where the fears expressed in England were confirmed.

His conferences with Poin-

care and Delcasse, the Minister for. Foreign Affa1rs, convinced
him that the basis of peace which he had discussed with Grey
would not be acceptable to France.

In regard to the territor-

ial ambitions of that nation he said: "The French not only want
Alsace and Lorraine but so much more that the two countries are

not within sight of peaoe. 1t

8

From Berlin, he wrote that he

was sadly disappolnted that " ••• we were misled into belfeving
that peaoe parleys might be begun upon a basis of evaouation
9
of Franoe and Belgium. 1t
As a result of his vis1ts and oonferenoes, House beoame oonvinoed that the U1vil Governments of
eaoh of the bel11gerents would weloome peaoe but feared to begin negotiations.

Beoause of the strength of the military

maohine and the intens1ty of feeling that had been developed
among the people, any proposal of peaoe terms whioh did not
s1gnify oomplete v1otory would have meant the downfall of
those in power.

Zimmerman, the

~erman

Seoretary of state in

oharge of Fore1gn Affairs, told House that peaoe parleys, upon
any terms that would have any· ohanoe of aooeptanoe would mean
10
the overthrow of the Government and the Kaiser.
House
summed up his 1mpressions in a message to Bryan in whioh he
stated:
tlEverybody wants peaoe, but nobody is willing
to oonoede enough to get it.
They all also
say that they desire a permanent settlement
so that no suoh disaster may ooour hereafter,
but aga1n there 1s suoh a divergenoe of ideaS"
as to how th1s should be brought about that
for the moment it is impossible to harmonize
the differenoes.
Germany is not willing to evaouate Belgium
at all, nor even Franoe, without an indemnlty,
and Count von Bernstorff's suggestlon that this
oould be arranged was wlde afield.
The Allles,
of oourse, will not oonsent to anything less;
and there the situatlon rests. 1t 11
8Seymour, Intlmate Papers, I, 399.
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Exoept to make it known that he held himself in readiness
to act in the interests of peace at any time, President4Wilson
made no further moves until late in the year 1915.

By that

time the position of the United States had become extremely
preoarious.

Beset on the one hand by Allied restrict10ns on

our trade, and on the other by the menaoe of the German submar1nes, the ma1ntenance of neutrality became increas1ngly
d1ff1cult.

Moreover, W11son's preoccupat1on with domestic

affa1rs, which had been a matter of such concern to House early
in the Adm1nistration, was now giv1ng way to a conviction that
the United States was dest1ned to playa very 1mportant part in
the solution Of world problems.

He was still determined to

keep out of the war 1f poss1ble, but he was beg1nning to quest10n whether such a course could be followed.

In a speech de-

livered at Milwaukee on January 31, 1916, he p01nted out that
the nations at war, who felt that they were strugg11ng for
the1r lives and honor, were constantly impelled to do things
wh10h were incons1stent with the rights of the United states
and which led to serious misunderstandings and difficulties.
In meeting these d1ff1cult1es, the Pres1dent stated, he WaS
charged w1th a two-fold duty: "In the first place, I know you
are depend1ng on me to keep.th1s nat10n out of war.

So far I

have done so, and I pledge you my word that, God helping me, I
will if
me.

i~

is possible.

But you have laid another duty upon

You have bidden me see to it that noth1ng stains or 1m-

pairs the honor of the United states, and that is a matter not
within my oontrol; that depends upon what others do, not upon
what the Government of the United States does; there may:at any
moment oome a time when I cannot preserve both the honor and
12
the peace of the United States.'t
The complexities of the situation brought House to the oonclusion that some definite action by the United States was necessary.

He felt that the policy of drifting and attempting to

settle our difficulties with first one and then another of the
belligerents could only result in the loss of the friendship
of the Allies and perhaps the ultimate victory of Germany.
The procedure which he advocated was for the President to demand a conference to negotiate peace upon the basis of complete
restitution by Germany and tmll guananties against future wars.
In case one

side~efused

such a conference, the United states

would enter the war on the side of the other.

As acceptance

of these terms by an undefeated Germany was extremely problematical, it virtually amounted to a proposal that the United
States should aid the Allies to enforce terms that they probably could.not enforce themselves.
House feared that President Wilson's desire to keep the
country out of war would cause him to reject a plan which involved direct intervention.
12
Baker and Dodd, IV, 48.

This fear was somewhat allayed

r __------------------------------------------~

,bY the President's assertion that he had never been sure ;bat

thiS country should remain aloof from the conflict and if Germany and militaristic ideas were to win, the oblisation of the
united states was greater than ever.

13

'rhus encouraged,

House developed his idea and a few weeks later submitted it to
the President.

Alth.ough startled by a plan which might eas-

ily lead to active participation, Wilson agreed that House
should begin an informal discussion with the Allies to deteralne their attitude toward a demand that hostilities cease.
The success of the plan depended upon a complete understanding
betwe~n

England and the United states and this he set himself

to 'bring a bout.

Letters from Grey, in the autumn of 1915,

had expressed his belief that the cessation of hostilities and,
.till more important, the prevention ot future wars, could be
.ecured only with the assistanoe of the United States.

In

one letter he inquired as to the willingness of the President
to propose a League of Nations w1th power to proceed against
any nat10n which violated treaties or internat10nal laws, or

.
14
refused to subm1t disputes to arbitrat1on.

The reply to Grey's letter, drafted by House and approved
Iy W11son, was an extremely s1gnif1oant document.
~.nly

It not only

expressed sympathy w1th the cause of the Allies, but

l3
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r
definitely proposed intervention and indicated the method of
procedure.

In it House stated that, in his opinion,

.'

It • • • it would be a world-wide calamity if the
war should continue to °a point where the Allies
could not, with the help of the United States,
bring about a peace along the lines you and I
What I want you to
have so often discussed.
know is that, whenever you c.onaider the time is
propitious for this intervention, I will propose
it to the President.
He may then desire me to
go to Europe in order that a more intimate understanding as to proceduremay be had.
It is in my mind that, afte~ conferring with
your Government, I should proceed to Berlin and
tell them that it was the President's purpose
to intervene and stop this destructive war, provided the weight of the United states thrown on
the Side that accepted our proposal could do it.
I would not let Berlin know, of course, of
any understanding with the Allies, but would
rather lead them to think our proposal would be
rejected by the Allies.
This might induce Be~
lin to accept the proposal, but, if they did not
do so, it would nevertheless be the purpose to
intervene.
If the Cent~l Powers were still obdurate, it would probably be necessary for us to
join the Allies a.nd ferce the issue." 15

The proposal was received by England with a noticeable lack
of enthusiasm.

This attitude was no doubt due to a number of

reasons, only a few of which need be mentioned here.

In the

first place, Engla.nd interpreted American protests against restrictions on her trade as evidence of unfriendliness to the
Allied cause.

Then too, the ideas expressed in the note were

such a radical departure from the long-established foreign

~

policy of the United States and from Wilson's own repeatedly
expressed sentiments, that some doubt may bave been felt as to

15
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,

whether this oountry would aotually enter the war.

And, fi-

nally, the terms of peaoe proposed ooinoided only with
publioly expressed war aims of the Allies.

~he

Seoret agreements

between the Allied Powers, in regard to territorial annexations, indemnities, and the politioal destruotion of the enemy,
were not taken into oonsideration.

Wilson and House were dis-

appOinted but not disoouraged by

indifferent reoeption

given to their offer.

th~

They felt that a better understanding

must be brought about and that this oould be best aooomplished
by again sending House to Europe to sound out the sentiments
of the belligerent Governments.
In the meantime,. House kept in touch with the German Ambassador.

He told him of his t0rthooming trip and said that if

Germany would consent to a plan of gene:ral disarmament, the
President would demand a peace oonferenoe.

He did not dis-

cuss with Demstorff the questions of territorial adjustment
or indemnity as he felt that these problems were best left to
the Allies.'

In dealing with Germany he advised Wilson it was

well to move ciroumspeotly, not permitting the German Government to lead them into an attitude that would place them in a·
16
di'&8reeable position with the Allies.
Bemstorfr forwarded the information received from House to his Government,
stressing the desirability of h1s mtssion for the purpose of
improving mutual relat1ons.

Unaware of the proposals already

16
seymour, Intimate Papers, II, 107.

made to Grey, he describecf1 House as being absolutely neutral,
very discreet and trustworthy, and standing in the very·center
17
of the political situation in America.
The German Foreign
Secretary, von Jagow, .responded by requesting House to visit
Germany first in order to discuss militarism as it applied to
18
tha t country.
House did not accede to the request of von Jagow as he
thought it advisable to proceed directly to London.

He sailed

on December 28, 1915, and upon his arrival in England immediately got in touch with the British statesmen.

To allay

doubts entertained by them as to the possibility of American
cooperation, Wilson sent an historic message to House: "Would
be

glad if yOu would convey my assurance that I would be will-

ing and glad, when the opportunity comes, to cooperate in a
policy seeking to bring about and maintain permanent peace a19
mong civilized nations."
During his stay in England House
conferred with the Prime Minister and other members of the
Cabinet.

President Wilson's desire to aid in bringing the

war to an end was laid before them, but no actionwwas taken.
17
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Their slowness to act was deplored by House, who felt that delay might be fatal to the success of the plan

inasmuch~s

the

uncertain state of our relations with both sets of belligerents was

~iable

to culminate in a crisis at any time.

He,

therefore, determined to go to Berlin to sound out the attitude of that Government toward a peace movement.
In Berlin, House was received in a most friendly manner by
the German officia.ls, but it soon beca.me evident that they
would not consider a peace based upon the terms suggested by
Wilson.

Although both the Chancellor and the Foreign Secre-

tary expressed a desire for peace they repudiated the idea of
a settlement which signified defeat for

Ger~ny.

Their real

attitude toward the efforts of President Wilson to initiate a
movement for a conference was disclosed a little later in messages to Bernstorff.

Bethman Hollweg stated that the people

of Germany felt that Wilson's policy conSistently favored England.

This impression was so marked than only some very

definite action against England would convince them that he
was sufficiently unbiased to offer his good offices in favor
of peace.

20

The Foreign Secretary, von Jagow, likewise ,ex-

pressed the belief that little could be expected from

If • • •

one

whose instincts are all in favor of the English pOint of view
and who, in addition, is so naive a statesman as President
Wilson."
20

Any attempt to effect a peace based upon the

German Documents, II, 974.

"(1

status guo

~J

he deemed absolutely unacceptable to Germany.

He recognized, however, the possibility that a change

o~'feel

ing in England coupled with German refusal to conclude peace
might induce the President to cooperate openly with the Allies.

..,

He instructed Bernstorff that, t'As soon a s Mr. Wilson IS media,

.

tion plans threaten to assume a more concrete form and an inclination on the part of England to meet him begins to manifest
itself, it will be the duty of your Exc111ency to prevent President Wilson from approaching us with a positive proposition to
mediate.

The chOice of the means to reach this result without

endangering our relations to the United states I venture to
leave to your Excellency's ability as a diplomat, since I am
not able to form a complete estimation of the Situation from
here."

21

After leaving Berlin, House proceeded to Paris where he set
;

himself to the task of creating a "good atmosphere."

His pol-....

icy up to this time had been to deal with the British with the
greatest frankness but leave to them the task of dealing with
the Allies.

However, the extreme deliberateness manifested by

the British in this matter, made him decide -to present the issue
direotly to the heads of the French Government.

•

He informed

Briand and Cambon that neither the President nor he felt ant
fears for the safety of the United states but that their deep
interest in the future of democratic prinoiples prompted them
21

Ibid., II, 978.

to take their present course.

He left them, according to his

report to Wilson, with the final understanding that no .ovement
for intervention would be made if the Allies were victorious
during the spring and summer but if the tide of war went against them or remained stationary, the United States would
22
intervene.
Upon his return to England, House won the support of Grey
to the plan of calling a peace conference, but no action could
be taken without the consent of the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet.

Several conferences with Lloyd George and a number

of his colleagues were encouraging but not conclusive.

After

one such conference, Grey and House drew up a memorandum which
outlined the action President Wilson would be prepared to take
and the terms of the peace he would endeavor to secure.

House

took this memorandum with him to Washington and submitted it
to the President for his approval.
in the cabled confirmation.

Only one change was made

The original text was changed

by the insertion of the word probably in the sentence which
read: "Colonel House expressed the opin:ion that if such a conference met, it would secure peace on terms not unfavourable
to the Allies; and if it failed to secure peace, the United
states would (probably) leave the Conference as a belligerent
23
on the side of the Allies if Germany was unreasonable."
22
Seymour, Intimate Papers, II, 164.
23
Text of Memorandum, Gre,y, II, 123.

The offer of the Pres1dent was not accepted at that or any
subsequent t1me.

Many reasons have been advanced for the

fa11ure ot those in power to seize thls opportunity to brlng
the confllct to an end.

Grey haa stated that England t s Al-

lies were oonvinoed that the1r natlonal interests oould be
served only by a deoisive defeat of Germany and they would resent the proposal of any terms whioh oould not be interpreted
as a viotory.

Moreover, as both

F~nce

and Russla had suf-

fered mOre from the war than England, who still possessed reserves ot men and resources, he hesitated to reoommend Wilson's
proposal tearing it might be interpreted as a weaken1ng ot

~~

lsh support.

He, theretore, oommun10ated the substanoe of
24
the memorandum to Brland w1thout a reoommendat10n.
Lloyd George, in hls Mem01rs, has attempted to tix respons1b111ty tor tailure to oall a conterence, whioh he sald would
have saved a whole year ot ruin, havoo, and destructlon.
advanoed three probable reasons_

He

The tirst was the reluotanoe

of Slr Edward Grey to press the matter upon Franoe and exert
pressure upon them tor acoeptance of the terms.

The second

probable reason was the insertion ot the none fatal word" ln
the gentleman's agreement drawn up by House and Grey.

He felt

that the insertion ot the word, probably, changed the whole
oharacter ot the

ag~eement,

whioh consequently gave no real

assurance of Amer1can cooperatlon.
24
~.,

II, 125.

But the real explanat1on,

he oonclucl:>:ded, was that

11 • • •

President Wilson was afraid of pub-

lio opinicoon in the U.S.A. and Sir Edward Grey was frightened
of our Allll.ies."

25

The reft fusal of the Allies to avail themselves of the President's aaassistanoe seemed to House to oonstitute one of the
26
The effeot upon Wilson,
monumental..rl blunders of the war.
and to a l£lesser degree upon House, was to raise in their
minds graVV"V8 doubts as to the sinoerity of the Allied Statesmen.

Sinonoe the beginning of the war Great Britain and

Franoe hadCi protested that they were fighting to save civilization from

the threat of autocratio and militaristic domination.

Nevertheleeess, they refused an opportunity to effeot a just and
permanent
to

peace, apparently hoping, by oontinuing the struggle,

eventua~lly

the event

crush their enemies.

House foresaw that, in

of Allied success, new and disturbing problems would

be created.Ei.

He noted in his diary; "A situation may arise,

if the AllJlies defeat Germany, where they may attempt to be
diotatoria.a.l in Europe and elsewhere.
where

they~

loan see quite olearly

may ohange their views on militarism and navalism.

It dependss entirely upon what nation uses it, whether it is
27
considered.Ei good or bad. II

25
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Chapter V
The End of Isolat1on
The fa1lure of the Al11ed Governments to take advantage of
his offer of med1ation was a bitter disappo1ntment to Pres1dent W1lson.

Through Colonel House he notif1ed Grey that,

unless peace negot1ations were soon inaugurated, the people of
the United states would demand that the Government adopt the
same vigorous attitude in regard to Allied v1olations of the1r
,1

neutral rights as had been adopted toward the Central Powers.
So ser10us was the state of pub11c op1nion that, according to
Lansing, only one th1ng saved our relations with Great Brita1n
from becoming strained to the breaking point.
which alone

sa~d

This one factor,

the British from a most ser10us situat1on,

was the stupid1ty displayed by the German Government in the conduct of its submarine warfare.

2

The submarine campaign against neutral vessels, wh1ch had
abated somewhat after the German declaration of September 1,
1915, was renewed 1n the spring of 1916.

In February the Ger-

man and Austro-Hunsarian Governments announced that armed merchant ships of the Al11es would henceforth be cons1dered as
aUXiliary cruisers and that, be1ng in the nature of naval ves1

Seymour, Intimate Papers, II, 286.
2

lanSing, War Memoirs, Ill.

v

sels, would be attacked Without warning.

3

This was in effect

an announcement of an unrestricted submarine war,

inasm~h

as

neutral as well as belligerent ships would be liable to attack.
The use by belligerents of neutral flags in dangerous waters .
constituted a menace to all shipping.

During the succeeding
;;,. .'7

weeks many ships in the vicinity of tne British Isles were torpedoed.

The most wanton of all these attacks was the sinking

on March 24 of the unarmed channel pass~nger boat, the Sussex.
As American lives had been lost the incident became a matter of concern to the American Government.

Both Colonel House

and Secretary lanSing were convinced that the time for writing
notes had passed and urged the President to take some decisive
action.

They fe·lt that the only practicable course under the

Circumstances was to break off diplomatic relations with Ger4

many.

Wilson, however, was reluctant to adopt a course;

which, he felt, would inevitably lead to war.

Although his

peace proposals had involved possible intervention against the
belligerent who refused to negotiate upon the basis of reasonable terms, he was loath to enter the war because of a quarrel
with Germany over the submarine.

The first· course, he thought,

would be a means of bringing an early and just peace, whereas

•

to enter the conflict in defense of our own rights would no1r
3
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4

LanSing, MemOirs, 135-6; and Seymour, Intimate Papers, II,
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only prolong the war, but lessen the influence of the United
states in the peace conference.

He accordingly refuse~ to

send the note prepared b,y Lansing which recalled Ambassador
Gerard.

Instead he drafted a reply himself in which he re-

viewed all the facts in the submarine controversy and concluded with the statement that: "Unless the Imperial Government shall now immediately declare and effect an abandonment
of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying
vessels, the Governaent of the United states can have no
choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire
5
altogether. It
In its reply to this note, Germany acceded to the demands
of the United states.

Submarine warfare in the future would

be confined to the fighting forces of the belligerents.

Mer-

chant vessels would not be sunk without warning or Without
saving human lives, unless they attempted to escape or offered
6
resistance.
This pledge was kept by Germany for about e+ght
months, during which tiae, as has been previously noted, our
relations with Great Britain became increasingly tense.
Before dispatching his Sussex note to Germany, the President
had made another unsuccessful appeal to the Allies to accept
his offer of mediation.

His efforts in this d1rection, al-

though apparently fruitless, had one very important result.
5
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During the period of negotiation, his ideas in regard to the
foreign policy of the United states were completely revelutionized.

His earlier conviction that the war was a purely

European affair whose causes could not touch us, had, by May
1916,· been replaced by the idea that: "We are participants
whether we would or not of the life of the world, for the interests of all nations are our own also.

We are partners

with the rest.

What affects mankind is inevitably our affair
7
as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and Asia. tI
The negotiations with Grey, perhaps the most moderate and
disinterested of the Allied statesmen, had led him to embrace
the idea of a world pact to provide a mutual guaranty of the
political independence and territorial integrity for all nations.

Early in 1916 he had pledged to Great Britain his

adherence to such a pact.

He announced his policy to the

American people in an address, on May 27, 1916, before the
League to Enforce Peace.

His intense desire to act as a me-

diator and to be instrumental in effecting a just and permanent peace, had impelled him to give serious consideration to
the basis upon which such a peace could

be

established.

His

plan, which he felt was in conformity with the American ideal,
was based upon two fundamental principles: the right of every
people to choose the sovereignt, under which they would live;
and the right of small nations to the same respect for their

7

Baker and Dodd, IV, 185.

soveriegnty and territorial integrity as was accorded to large
and powerful states.

.'

In pledging the cooperation of the

United states in any feasible associat1on of nat10ns to secure
and guarantee these rights, Wilson expressed the conviction
that he was acting in accordance with the wishes of the Ameri8
can people.
By this declaration, Wilson def1nitely abandoned the historic American policy of 1so1ation and accepted
the idea of a League of Nations as the keynote of his foreign
policy.
During the summer and early fall of 1916, the PreSidential
campaign was the matter of paramount interest in the United
States.

As was to be expected, problems growing out of the

war became involved in the campaign issues-.

Irritation a-

gainst England was increased by her unyielding attitude and
the issuance of the blaok 11st.

Relations with Germany, on

the other hand, were comparatively smooth.

The inst1tution

of unrestricted U-boat warfare, whioh was a constant souroe of
oontroversy in Germany, was withheld largely through the efforts of Count Bernstorff.

He oonsistently po1nted out to his

Government that suoh a oourse could only result in the breaking
off of relations and the entrance of the United States 1nto the
war. 9
8

Ibid., IV, 185.
9
The Correspondenoe between Bernstorff and the German Foreign
Office, between June and September 1916, is contained 1n
German Doouments, II, 978-85.

86
Wilson accepted his re-election to the Presidency, after a
campaign based on the slogan "He kept us out of war, It as an·'
endorsement by the people of the United states of his policy
of neutrality.

Shortly after the election he, therefore, un-

dertook to inaugurate a new movement for peace.
.
,

,:;.

...,

He suggested

sending a note to the belligerents demanding the cessation of
the war.

Unless this action was taken he felt we would inevi-

tably drift into war with Germany over therjubmarine issue.
Warnings had been received from Ambassador Gerard that Germany
intended to break her promise of May 4 and institute unrestricted submarine warfare unless peace came soon.

Colonel

House, upon being consulted, advised against the initiation of
any movement in this direction without first obtaining the
sent of the Allies.

con~

He argued that any demand for a peace

conference would be interpreted as a definitely antriendly act
and as an effort on the part of the United States to avert a
crisis over the submarine issue and also to save Germany from

10
of international obligations.
11
Similar views were expressed by secretary Lansing_
the consequences of her

disre~rd

President Wilson refused to accept the advice given but did
mOdify his propo,al.

Instead of demanding peace, his note

sent to the belligerents on December 18 was an appeal to them
to state the terms upon which they would be willing to negoti10
Seymour, Intimate papers, II, 390-1.
11
Lansing, MemOirs, 178.

~

a.te.
I

12

All hope of favorable results from this appeal wa.s

nullified, however, by the issuanoe on Deoember 12 of idVltio
notes addressed by the Central Powers to the Entente Governments, expressing their willingness to enter a peaoe oonfer13
enoe.
Wilsonappreoiated the danger that the Allies might
,feel that he was aoting in oollaboration with Germany but he
"

nevertheless determined to send his note.

In it he expressed

the hope that an interchange of views would disclose that the
terms of the belligerents were not so irreoonoilable as had
been feared.

His statement that the war aims eXpressed by

the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides were virtually
the same was reoeived in England, aooording to Page, with
14
,
" ••• surprise and sorrowful oonsternation."
'The English, he
stated, interpreted the President's remarks as plaoing the Allies and the Central Powers on the same moral level.

The

British themselves felt that they were fighting a holy and defensive war to save free government from military tyranny.
The President's request was refused by both the Central
powers and the Allies.

GerDBny, although expressing her will-

ingness to begin negotiations, refused to make an announoement
of her war aims.

15

The Allies refused on the grounds that

12
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only a sat1sfactory conclus1on of the war could br1ng a permanent peace.

At the moment, they stated, 1t would be

~ope-

less to expect Germany to consent to the po11cy of reparat1on,
rest1tut1on and gua rant1es, that would be necesaary to 1nsure
16
such a peace.
The fa1lure of these peace moves prec1p1tated a cr1s1s 1n
Germany.

The d1sastrous effects of the Eng11sh block ade were

becom1ng not1ceable and the C1v1l Government was cnnsequently
forced to accede to the demands of the extreme mil1tarists.
The1r prom1ses to br1ng a qu1ck end to the war by an unrestr1cted submar1ne campa1gn were f1nally accepted by the GovI

ernment.

Off1c1al notice of this

Bemstorff on January 19.

dec1sion~'was

forwarded to

He was 1nstructed to notify the

Amer1can Government on t he evening of January 31 of the new
po11cy.

Bemstorff warned h1s Government that wap was 1nev-

1table 1f the contemplated course was pursued and adv1sed de.
17
lay that the Pres1dent m1ght con~inue his efforts for peace.
Th1s advice was not heeded, however, and on February 1, 1917,
Germany began an unrestr1cted submarine war.
The Pres1dent learned of the German act10n first through an
Assoc1ated Press bullet1n.

H1s react10n to the news has been

descr1bed by Tumulty: "W1thout comment, It he sa1d, ttl la1d the
fateful s11p of paper on his desk, and Silently watched h1m as

16
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he read and then re-read

I seemed to read his mind in

it.

the expressions that racfl!!ed across his strong features:

~irst,

blank amazement, then inc:::::redulity that eyen Germany could be
guilty of such perfidy;

~hen

gravity and sternness, a sudden

grayness of oolour, a comapression of the lips and the familiar
locking of the jaw which

always characterized him in moments

of supreme resolution.

Handing the paper back to me, he said,

in quiet tones, 'This meaLns war.
tried so hard to prevent

The break that we have
18
now seems inevitable.' tt

Colonel House also testified to the bitter disappointment
of President Wilson at th:_is sudden and unwarranted action of
LEe had placed great reliance on the

the German Government.

hopes, extended by Bernst.orff, of securing definite peace proposals from Berlin.

Thi=s sudden reversal of poliey, when all
19
the talk was of peace, arooused in him an interise resentment.
Moreover, the German annovuncement came at a time when the President was more than eyer

~onyinced

should remain out of the

~ar.

Allied Cause and his

cony~ctlon

depended upon the defeat
ing 1916.

The refusal

~f
o~

that the United states

His earlier sympathy for the·
that the welfare of the world

Germany bad undergone a change durthe Allies to accept his offer of

mediation bad made him susspicious of their motives in forcing
a continuance of the war.

In addition he feared that Ameri-
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19
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can aSsIstance, if given, would be used merely for the attainment of national ambitions by the Allied nations.

Ano1her

vital reason for his opposition to war was his convIction that
he ruled by the Will of the people.

His recent re-election

he interpreted as a mandate from the people to keep them out of
war.
But despIte these considerations President Wilson did not
On February 3 he announced to Congress the
20
He expressed the
breaking off of relations with Germany.

delay

action~

hope that war might still be averted.

He told Congress that

only actual overt acts could convince him that Germany really
overt acts, how-

Intended to carry out the threatened policy-

ever, were not lacking and served the double purpose of convincing the President that War was inevItable and of crystallizing publIc opinion.

The publication on February 26 of

Zimmerman's telegram, Offering an alliance to Mexico with the
promise that she could regain from the United States by conquest the territory lost at an earlier date, raised resentment
in the United States to the highest pitch.

T~

res~ts

of

this telegram were, according to LanSing, to transform popular
indifference into intense hostility to Germany and to convert
pacifism and a desire for continued inaction into demands for
war.

Public sentiment was unified against Germany and support

20
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of the acts of the Executive was assured.
The sinking by German submarines of a. number of Amer!6.an
vessels seemed to make action by the United States imperative.
The question of the nature of this action was submitt.ed by the
President to his Cabinet at the regular meeting on March 20.
The Cabinet was of the unanimous opin\8n that war was inevitable and that Congress should be called in extraordinary session
22
as soon as possible.
Lansing's note: on this momentous
meeting are significant:
"Thus ended a Cabinet meeting the influence of
which may change the course of history and determine the destin1es of the United states and
possibly of the world.
The possible results
are almost inconceivably great.
I am sure
that every member of tbB Cabinet felt the vital
importance of the occasion and spoke with a
full rea11zation of the grave responsibility
which rested upon him as he advised the President to adopt a course which if followed can
only mean open and v1sorous war against the
Kaiser and his government.
The solemn1ty of
the occasion as one after another spoke was
increasingly impressive and showed in every
mants face as he arose from the council table
and prepared to leave the room." 23
On April 2, 1917, President Wilson read to the jo1nt session
of the two houses of Congress, the message which marked the
abandonment by the United states of a principle which had been
an integral part of her policy since the inception of the na-

...

tion.

It has been the purpose of this paper to trace the

21
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main steps by which this' decisionwas reached and to outline
briefly some of the difficulties which beset the
path.

Preside~tts

At the beginning of his executive career, Woodrow Wil-

son was devoted to the policy of isolation,

Domestio reform

was the keynote of his policy and foreign affairs received a
scant share of his attention.

Continued absorption, in dom-

estic matters was rendered impossible by the outbreak of the
European War.

The relation of the United States to the other

nations of tile world now assumed new significance.

Though

striving outmrdly to maintain a strict impartiality, both by
training and tradition his sympathy was with England.

His

a elmira tion ot the English system was eqlJt9.lled by his detestation of the autooraoy and militarism which, he felt, was characteri stic of the German Government.
Wilson's sympathy for England wa!! put to a severe test during, the oourse of the war.

In the beginning, the object of

his diplomacy was the adoption of a policy which, while maintaining the honor of the United states, would not hinder EngI

land's attainment of her national desires.

England's deter-

mination, however, to let neither the rights of neutrals nor
the observance of international law interfere with her policy,
had the

ulti~te

effect of exhausting the patience of

Pre~i

dent Wilson and undermining his faith in their motives.
The effect of England's naval policy upon Germany was the
factor which ultimately determined the course of action in the

United states.

-

The issue is succinctly stated by Kenworthy

and Young who observed that:

ft • • •

one effect of the Brftish

blockade was so to irritate Germany into so irritating America
24
that Britain could continually screw the Vise tighter."
In
the last analySis, therefore, the decision of Presldent Wilson
was forced, neither by his own sympathies nor by the character
of his intercourse with Great Britain, but by the ruthless
character of German submarine warfare.

Both nations had vio-

lated American rights repeatedly and grievously.

But bal-

anced against British disregard for property rights, was German dlsregard for human rights.

This was the flnal factor

that influenced Wilson's action.

When he became cQnv1nced

that he could not remain out of the war and still maintain the
sovere1gn rights and the honor of the Unlted States, he took
the eventful step that led to active part1cipation in the European War.

24
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